Credulity, lies, and costly talk
By Navin Kartik, Marco Ottaviani, Francesco Squintani. Journal of Economics Theory, 2007
417 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Safety Research
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/fa1963b4ded65140b460b6f9e12251792ab38656
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Management Science and Operations Research
- Nagore Iriberri
- Johannes Abeler
- Vincent P. Crawford
- Daniele Nosenzo
- Collin Raymond
- Miguel A. Costa-Gomes
- Joshua Schwartzstein
- Armin Falk
In Safety Research
- Johannes Abeler
- Joshua Schwartzstein
- Anke Becker
- Nagore Iriberri
- Vincent P. Crawford
- Daniele Nosenzo
- Collin Raymond
- Miguel A. Costa-Gomes
Citations in the corpus
- Strategic Communication with Lying Costs (2009, background): “More precisely, the solution to the initial value problem hits the upper bound of 1 at some t < 1.12 Theorem 1 contrasts with the main result of Kartik et al. (2007), who show that when the type space is not bounded above, a separating monotone equilibrium exists for any k > 0.”
- Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications (2013, result): “Econometric type estimates are broadly consistent with earlier results.65 The model gives a unified explanation of subjects’ excessive 65 See also Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007).”
- Coarse Thinking and Persuasion (2008, background): “Kartik, Ottaviani, and Squintani (2007) present a related model that incorporates the possibility of equilibrium deception or misinterpretation of information.”
- Preferences for Truth‐Telling (2016, background): “…economics, psychology and sociology has begun to study patterns of reporting behavior empirically and a string of theoretical papers has been built on the assumption of some preference for truth-telling (e.g., Kartik et al. 2007, Matsushima 2008, Ellingsen and Östling 2010, Kartik et al. 2014).”
- Representative evidence on lying costs (2014, background): “This suggests that studying the theoretical implications of such costs (e.g., Kartik et al., 2007, 2014; Doerrenberg et al., 2013) is a promising research avenue.”
- The Credit Ratings Game (2012, neutral): “default is smaller than ).(29) To keep the analysis of this more complex game as tractable as possible we also make some simpli.”