Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games

By Hongbin Cai, Joseph Tao-yi Wang. Games Econ. Behav., 2006

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Strategic Communication with Lying Costs (2009, background): “…and Shantikumar (2004) and Healy and Wahlen (1999) provide empirical evidence of inflated language in the context of stock recommendations and earnings statements respectively, while Blume et al. (2001) and Cai and Wang (2006) document it in experimental strategic information transmission games.”
Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling (2009, background): “More recently, Cai and Wang (2006) have provided evidence showing that senders reveal more private information than predicted by the most informative sequential equilibrium and explained this finding by means of the quantal response equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998) and a behavioral ty”
Trust in Forecast Information Sharing (2011, background): “Another group of experiments uses signaling games to study cheap talk in information exchange (e.g., Cai and Wang 2006).”
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF COLLECTIVE DELIBERATION (2011, background): “24 This is consistent with " excessive " truthful reporting observed in other experimental setups, such as the Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting, see Cai and Wang (2006).”