Pairwise kidney exchange

By Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Snmez, §. M.Utkunver, Anna Bogomolnaia, Francis Delmonico, H. Moulin, Muriel Niederle, S. Saidman. Journal of Economics Theory, 2005

620 citations recorded by the source corpus.

In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sonmez, and Unver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of those discussions it became clear that a likely first step will be to implement pairwise exchanges, between just two patient-donor pairs, as these are logistically simpler than exchanges involving more than two pairs. Furthermore, the experience of these surgeons suggests to them that patient and surgeon preferences over kidneys should be 0-1, i.e. that patients and surgeons should be indifferent among kidneys from healthy donors whose kidneys are compatible with the patient. This is because, in the United States, transplants of compatible live kidneys have about equal graft survival probabilities, regardless of the closeness of tissue types between patient and donor (unless there is a rare perfect match). In the present paper we show that, although the pairwise constraint eliminates some potential exchanges, there is a wide class of constrained-efficient mechanisms that are strategy-proof when patient-donor pairs and surgeons have 0-1 preferences. This class of mechanisms includes deterministic mechanisms that would accommodate the kinds of priority setting that organ banks currently use for the allocation of cadaver organs, as well as stochastic mechanisms that allow considerations of distributive justice to be addressed.

Subfields: Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health, Pulmonary and Respiratory Medicine, Transplantation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7f1f1a6e7b120b8db472b93922b80f323711bbb4

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In Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health

M. Utku Ünver

Citations in the corpus

Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources (2015, positive): “19Previous developments of Gale’s idea—e.g., Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999, 2003), Pápai (2000), Ehlers et al. (2002), Ehlers and Klaus (2004), and Roth et al. (2004)—required each agent to point to his or her top choice among unmatched houses and hence allowed only top trading cycles.”
Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2013, neutral): “These include problems involving identifying optimal sets of kidney “exchanges” (in such an exchange, a patient with a willing but incompatible donor can “swap” her donor with that of another patient in a similar position) where edge weights are derived from cardinal utilities [511, 512, 17, 513, 42”
Matching With (Branch‐of‐Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy (2013, neutral): “More recent applications of market design include school choice, kidney exchange (Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2007), Ünver (2010)), course allocation (Sönmez and Ünver (2010), Budish and Cantillon (2012)), and internet ad auctions (Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007), Varian…”
When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient (2012, neutral): “Bogomolnaia, Moulin, and Stong [11] thoroughly explore the general social choice problem with dichotomous preferences; matching mechanisms for dichotomous preferences are studied by Bogomolnaia and Moulin [10] and Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver [34].”
Online Matching and Ad Allocation (2013, neutral): “However, in other applications, most notably the kidney exchange markets (see [87] for details), there is only one type of an agent.”
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications (2013, neutral): “Or, manufacturers may need to match with multiple suppliers, ensuring mutual compatibility of products or the right combination of capabilities.”
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism: Strategy-proofness as Equal Access (2006, neutral): “…design projects in which there was an obvious market failure to be repaired, e.g. the lack of a thick market resulting in very few kidney exchanges (Roth et al. 2004, 2005), or the unraveling that reduced mobility in the market for gastroenterologists (Niederle and Roth, 2003, 2005), or the…”
A Survey of the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants (2008, neutral): “In addition to a direct application of assigning people to twin-rooms, SR has applications for pairings of players in chess tournaments [45] and pairwise kidney exchange between incompatible patient-donor pairs [55, 25].”
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015, neutral): “Initiated by Roth, Sönmez, and Ünver (2004, 2005, 2007), even the organ transplantation problem has become a subject of market design research in recent years.”