Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side-Channel

By D. Page. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2002

337 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e9daea3415a70b976b514f09beb5917ecd41fadd

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Citations in the corpus

Cryptanalysis of DES Implemented on Computers with Cache (2003, unknown): “In 2002, cache based cryptanalysis [9] was proposed where cache hits and/or cache misses are observed by the use of electric power or magnetic force.”
Wait a Minute! A fast, Cross-VM Attack on AES (2014, background): “– Shared Pages: Deduplicated pages that are shared between users or processes.”
Cache Template Attacks: Automating Attacks on Inclusive Last-Level Caches (2015, methodology): “Page deduplication between virtual machines is commonly disabled in order to prevent more coarse-grained attacks like fingerprinting operating systems and files [41, 48] as well as Flush+Reload.”
Efficient Cache Attacks on AES, and Countermeasures (2010, background): “Countermeasures which require hardware modification are discussed in [47,48,10,50,49].”
Side-Channel Attacks: Ten Years After Its Publication and the Impacts on Cryptographic Module Security Testing (2005, unknown): “[46] D.”
S$A: A Shared Cache Attack That Works across Cores and Defies VM Sandboxing -- and Its Application to AES (2015, background): “As explained in Section II, a user does not use the physical memory directly.”
Covert and Side Channels Due to Processor Architecture (2006, background): “Cache-based side channel attacks were studied in [26-27].”
Faster and Timing-Attack Resistant AES-GCM (2009, background): “Initially, timing attacks were mostly mentioned in the context of public-key algorithms until Kelsey et al. [20] and Page [30] considered timing attacks, including cache-timing attacks, against secret-key algorithms.”
Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScript (2015, background): “erences between cache hits and cache misses. Cache attacks were ﬁrst mentioned by Kocher [22] and Kelsey et al. [23]. Later practical attacks on cryptographic algorithms have been explored thoroughly [24]–[27]. They evict data from the cache by accessing large memory buffers. In 2006 Osvik et al. [2”
ARMageddon: Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices (2015, methodology): “Initially, cache timing attacks were performed on cryptographic algorithms [10, 31, 32, 41, 42, 45, 56].”
New cache designs for thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks (2007, background): “In 2002, Page [14] described a theoretical attack exploiting cache misses.”
Cache-timing attacks on AES (2005, background): “Page in [20], and then Tsunoo, Saito, Suzaki, Shigeri, and Miyauchi in [22], presented fast timing attacks on DES when all S-boxes were out of cache before each DES call.”
Cache Attacks and Countermeasures: The Case of AES (2006, unknown): “In 2002, Page [9] described theoretical attacks using cache misses, but assumed the ability to identify cache misses with very high temporal resolution; its applicability in realistic scenarios is unclear.”
Inferring Fine-grained Control Flow Inside SGX Enclaves with Branch Shadowing (2016, background): “The most popular and well-studied microarchitectural side channel is a CPU cache timing channel first developed by [29, 34, 40] to break cryptosystems.”
Private Circuits: Securing Hardware against Probing Attacks (2003, background): “Electromagnetic radiation [33, 16, 34], compromisi ng emanations [36], crosstalk onto the power line [37, 35], return signals obtained by illu minating electronic equipment [3, 35], magnetic fields [32], cache hit ratios [24, 30], and even sounds given off by rotor machines [23] can similarly give t”