Wait a Minute! A fast, Cross-VM Attack on AES

By Gorka Irazoqui Apecechea, Mehmet Sinan Inci, Thomas Eisenbarth, Berk Sunar. International Symposium on Recent Advances in Intrusion Detection, 2014

318 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Artificial Intelligence, Information Systems, Signal Processing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/135d6f50f43dc278d20026352f0051ac368ce315

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Citations in the corpus

ARMageddon: Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices (2015, background): “However, full-key recovery is possible with the same techniques by considering more sophisticated attacks targeting different rounds [48, 55], even for asynchronous attackers [23, 27].”
The Spy in the Sandbox - Practical Cache Attacks in Javascript (2015, methodology): “To evaluate the bandwidth of this covert channel, we wrote a simple program that iterates over memory in a predetermined pattern.”
Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks (2017, background): “Matsui [70] was the first to show a bit-sliced implementation of AES.”
Cache Template Attacks: Automating Attacks on Inclusive Last-Level Caches (2015, methodology): “Among the presented attacks is the application of Cache Template Attacks to infer keystrokes and—even more severe—the identification of specific keys on Linux and Windows user interfaces.”
Fallout: Leaking Data on Meltdown-resistant CPUs (2019, background): “, web server function calls [81], user input [29, 50, 67], kernel addressing information [27], and cryptographic algorithms [6, 8, 19, 43, 64, 80].”
SgxPectre Attacks: Leaking Enclave Secrets via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “s (to the same memory) will be served by the cache, unless evicted by the victim program. Therefore, cache misses will reveal the victim’s cache usage of the target cache set. In FLUSH-RELOAD attacks [26, 82, 81, 12, 85, 9], the adversary shares some physical memory pages (e.g., throughdynamicshared”
Last-Level Cache Side-Channel Attacks are Practical (2015, methodology): “The same technique has been used in other scenarios [5, 22, 35, 44, 48].”
CacheZoom: How SGX Amplifies The Power of Cache Attacks (2017, background): “Flush+Reload can be applied across VMs [31], in Platform as a service (PaaS) clouds [57] and on smartphones [35].”
A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware (2016, background): “Some attacks rely on shared memory [24, 63, 71, 81, 105, 147, 168, 169, 181], e.”
S$A: A Shared Cache Attack That Works across Cores and Defies VM Sandboxing -- and Its Application to AES (2015, methodology): “Modern memory saving features like Kernel Samepage Merging (KSM) [3], [4] have also been shown to threaten the security of cryptographic processes as proven by Gullasch et.al [5], recovering AES keys with as few as 100 encryptions.”
DRAMA: Exploiting DRAM Addressing for Cross-CPU Attacks (2015, background): “Flush+Reload [2, 12, 28] have been presented to either build covert or side channels.”
Leaky Cauldron on the Dark Land: Understanding Memory Side-Channel Hazards in SGX (2017, unknown): “, access driven attacks [17]) have been demonstrated on x86 architectures, including data caches (and also per-core L2 unified caches) [31], [30], [28], [36], [17], [18], instruction caches [8], [9], [43], and inclusive LLCs [41], [40], [12], [44], [22], [27], [20], [16], [29], [19], [23], [26], [42”
Cross-Tenant Side-Channel Attacks in PaaS Clouds (2014, methodology): “[15] utilized a similar Flush-Reload side channel (a special case of our NFA-based framework) in a cross-VM context to break AES keys.”
SgxPectre: Stealing Intel Secrets from SGX Enclaves Via Speculative Execution (2018, background): “In Flush-Reload attacks [3, 6, 20, 83, 84, 87], the adversary shares some physical memory pages ( e.g. , through dynamic shared libraries) with the victim.”
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2015, background): “Several authors demonstrate efficient crypto attacks [50], [30], [11], [48].”