Cache-timing attacks on AES

By Daniel J. Bernstein. 2005

1,052 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/352e74019d86163d73618f03429ae452ab429629

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Citations in the corpus

The Spy in the Sandbox - Practical Cache Attacks in Javascript (2015, result): “…Hu in 1992 [11] , several results have Figure 1: The Intel Ivy Bridge Cache Architecture (taken from [22]) shown how the cache side-channel can be used to recover AES keys [17, 4], RSA keys [19], and even allow one virtual machine to compromise another virtual machine running on the same host [20].”
Flush+Flush: A Fast and Stealthy Cache Attack (2015, methodology): “We attack the OpenSSL T-Table-based AES implementation that is known to be susceptible to cache attacks [2, 30].”
CacheBleed: a timing attack on OpenSSL constant-time RSA (2016, background): “Both [9] and [45] mention that cache-bank conflicts cause timing variations and warn that these may result in a timing channel which may leak information about low address bits.”
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2015, background): “Cache side-channel attacks [47], [12], [40], [7], [8], [14], [46], [44], [52] are most closely related to the attacks described in this paper, as both exploit”
ARMageddon: Cache Attacks on Mobile Devices (2015, methodology): “Initially, cache timing attacks were performed on cryptographic algorithms [10, 31, 32, 41, 42, 45, 56].”
High-Resolution Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems (2017, background): “They generally assume an attacker with low privilege such as an unprivileged process [37], a virtual machine attacking its neighbors [38] or an attacker measuring server response time across the network [11].”
Cross-VM side channels and their use to extract private keys (2012, background): “This inﬂuence can be exploited by an attacker who can measure many such timings to statistically infer information about the key (e.g., [4,11,13,26]).”
FPGA-Based Remote Power Side-Channel Attacks (2018, background): “Timing channel attacks infer confidential information by observing data-dependent timing variations from sources such as caches [35], program execution [36], and network latencies [34], [37].”
S$A: A Shared Cache Attack That Works across Cores and Defies VM Sandboxing -- and Its Application to AES (2015, background): “The address translation step creates an additional challenge to the attacker since real addresses of the variables of the target process are unknown to him.”
Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScript (2015, background): “Practical attacks on cryptographic algorithms have been explored thoroughly [8,31].”
CATalyst: Defeating last-level cache side channel attacks in cloud computing (2016, background): “Such constant time implementations avoid secret-dependent memory accesses and branches [5, 6].”
A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware (2016, background): “Bernstein [25] showed that timing variations due to self-contention can be exploited for mounting a practical remote attack against AES.”
The Skein Hash Function Family (2009, methodology): “For example, AES has been successfully cryptanalyzed using a side channel associated with its table lookups [12, 20].”
New cache designs for thwarting software cache-based side channel attacks (2007, background): “The partitioned cache can not, however, defend against attacks based on internal interference; a private partition still allows code within a process to contend for cache lines and cause interference, as in Bernstein’s statistical attack.”