What's measured is what matters: targets and gaming in the English public health care system

By Gwyn Bevan, Christopher C. Hood. 2006

1,363 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Finance, General Health Professions

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e98f90e166542a9b0ec5171f641a30b48cd09884

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Citations in the corpus

Constitutive Effects of Performance Indicators: Getting beyond unintended consequences (2014, background): “Measure fixation may lead to gaming defined as a ‘deliberate subversion’ to ‘hit the target and miss the point’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006).”
The Politics of Governance Ratings (2008, background): “Pollitt (forthcoming) explains the prominence of the WGIs by the ‘‘power of numbers’’ and their prominent role within ‘‘late modernism,’’ citing the works of Alonso and Starr (1987), Porter (1995), Tsoukas (1997), Bevan and Hood (2006), Boyne et al. (2006), Bouckaert and Halligan (2008), Hood (2007)”
The Performative University: ‘Targets’, ‘Terror’ and ‘Taking Back Freedom’ in Academia (2020, background): “…the old Soviet Union maintained an economic system of central production targets for all state enterprises, combined with harsh punitive forms of accountability for those hapless directors who did not meet targets, a system aptly characterised as ‘targets and terror’ (Bevan and Hood, 2006).”
Career concerns and multitasking local bureaucrats: Evidence of a target-based performance evaluation system in China (2018, background): “Under the target-based system, ﬁrms or individuals would be incentivized to manipulate data and reporting to achieve the pre-set goal (Bevan and Hood, 2006; Chen et al., 2012; Gao, 2015).”
Performance Management in Universities: Effects of the Transition to More Quantitative Measurement Systems (2012, background): “…sector, pointing to the issues, problems and especially the negative/dysfunctional consequences of performance measurement (see, e.g. Smith, 1995; Lapsley, 1996; Northcott and Llewellyn, 2003; Bevan and Hood, 2006; Hood, 2007; McLean et al., 2007; de Bruijn, 2007; Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008).”
Incentives and their dynamics in public sector performance management systems (2010, background): “…to monetary and intrinsic incentives, empirical research also suggests that agents respond strongly to non-pecuniary incentives, which in the public sector, most frequently involve the potential for public recognition for performance (Bevan & Hood, 2006; Walker & Boyne, 2006; Heinrich, 2007).”
The Problem with Metrics is a Fundamental Problem for AI (2020, neutral): “study about “a system of governance of public services that combined targets with an element of terror” developed for England’s health care system in the 2000s covers many ways that gaming can occur (Bevan and Hood 2006). The authors identify three welldocumented forms of gaming from Soviet era prod”
THE USE OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: EFFECTS ON PERFORMANCE (2014, background): “The NPM programme evolves around explicit, enforceable performance contracting (cf. Bevan & Hood, 2006; Newberry & Pallott, 2004).”
Fairness and Accountability Design Needs for Algorithmic Support in High-Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making (2018, background): “This is despite how internal gaming is extensively highlighted in the public administration literature in relation to targets and the rise of New Public Management [7], a broad movement towards ‘rationalisation’ in the public sector that clearly affected informants around the world.”