Do Some Outside Directors Play a Political Role?*

By Anup Agrawal, C. Knoeber. Journal law and economy, 2001

1,055 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cf6b55a2e8083496c559563bf03cbdab23607631

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Citations in the corpus

Political Connectedness and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany (2010, background): “, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) and Faccio (2006)) and thereby increase its performance.”
Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, positive): “Likewise, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) bring to light the fact that politically-experienced directors are more prevalent in U.S. manufacturing firms where politics might affect their performance (through, for example, government purchases, trade policy, and environmental regulation). In the same regar”
Women on board: does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk? (2016, background): “On the demand side, socially responsible firms may be more likely to appoint women to the boardroom, because female director appointments are arguably one way through which firms seek legitimacy (Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach, 1998; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001).”
The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Financial Performance (2008, background): “Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) find that outside directors with political and legal backgrounds are more likely to be on the boards of companies that sell to the government or face government regulation.”
Political connections, financing and firm performance: Evidence from Chinese private firms ☆ (2008, background): “It has been found that political connections help firms to secure favorable regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001) and access to resources such as bank loans (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Faccio, 2006), which ultimately increases the value of firms (Roberts, 1990; Fisman, 2001; Ramalho, 2007)…”
Explaining Corporate Governance: Boards, Bylaws, and Charter Provisions (2003, background): “…1993; Yermack, 1996), but for some industries, such as commercial banking, the benefits from a larger board (such as political clout with a regulatory body as in Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) or help with attracting more business) may outweigh the increased communication and coordination costs.”
Capital Structure, CEO Dominance, and Corporate Performance (2011, neutral): “In economics and finance, a large number of studies address related questions (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Denis and Denis, 1995; Parrino, 1997; Huson, Malatesta and Parrino, 2001; Malmendier and Tate, 2003; and Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). We aptly contribute to the rich ”
Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, positive): “Close connections in the form of well-known friendships and connections are identified by several sources (The Economist, Forbes or Fortune) and prior studies (e.g., Backman, 1999; Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; and Fisman, 2001).”
Politically-Connected CEOs, Corporate Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China's Partially Privatized Firms (2014, methodology): “Our evidence that bureaucrats seek rents from firms complements several recent studies that focus on political connections and rent seeking ( Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Hadlock, Lee, and Parrino, 2002; Helland and Sykuta, 2004; Faccio, 2006).”
Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying (2013, positive): “Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) argue that the value of political connections are affected by firms’ reliance on the government as a customer and the degree of government regulation, where both factors vary by industry.”
Political connections of newly privatized firms (2008, background): “Likewise, Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) show that politically-experienced directors (i.”