Determinants and Effects of Corporate Lobbying
By Matthew D. Hill, G. W. Kelly, G. Lockhart, R. V. Ness. 2013
141 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/1bf5e6fdd5929e2fd7d61f13792c70deb5d3fbfd
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Angela K. Davis
- David A. Guenther
- B. Williams
- Linda K. Krull
- Tarek Abdelfattah
- Christopher Nobes
- Jennifer Blouin
- Michelle Hanlon
In Strategy and Management
Citations in the corpus
- Do Socially Responsible Firms Pay More Taxes (2016, background): “" Hines, Horwitz, and Nichols (2010) and Henderson and Malani (2009) make similar arguments.”
- Corporate donations and shareholder value (2017, unknown): “These numbers are largely consistent with those presented in previous studies, for example, Hill et al. (2013) show that 15% of firms are engaged in lobbying or political donations, and donated $152,000 in 2004, augmenting to $334,000 in 2011.”
- Advancing the Empirical Research on Lobbying (2014, unknown): “This is true for a wide of variety of firms across a number of industries and a number of years in the United States (Ansolabehere et al. 2002; Hansen et al. 2004; Hochberg 2009; Richter et al. 2009; Guo 2009; Hill et al. 2011).”
- Aggregate and Idiosyncratic Political Risk: Measurement and Effects (2016, unknown): “Prior research finds that managers’ and non-corporate call participants’ discussions typically center around uncertainties that the firm is facing (Hollander et al. (2010); Bowen et al.”