Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms
By Omrane Guedhami, Jeffrey A. Pittman, Walid Saffar. 2014
295 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/75c299963c354ce4d7d85d45d51daada3d032059
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Oliver M. Rui
- Xiangang Xin
- Gary Gang Tian
- Mikhail Pevzner
- Xiaofei Pan
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Donghui Wu
- Jeffrey A. Pittman
In Strategy and Management
- Jeong‐Bon Kim
- Mikhail Pevzner
- Xiangang Xin
- Gary Gang Tian
- Xiaofei Pan
- Jeffrey A. Pittman
- Meijun Qian
- Xiaping Cao
Citations in the corpus
- Foreign institutional ownership and auditor choice: Evidence from worldwide institutional ownership (2018, methodology): “Control variables We draw on the extant literature to identify and control for a wide range of firm, industry, and country characteristics that may influence firms’ auditor choices (Choi & Wong, 2007; Francis et al., 1999; Guedhami et al., 2014).”
- Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness (2013, unknown): “…literature shows that political connections are valuable resources to individual firms in both developing and developed countries and are important domestic arrangements affecting firms’ strategic choices (e.g., Faccio 2006; Goldman et al. 2009; Guedhami et al. 2014; Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006).”
- Political capital and CEO entrenchment: Evidence from CEO turnover in Chinese non-SOEs (2017, methodology): “However, in the spirit of Boubakri et al. (2012) and Guedhami et al. (2014), we employ propensity score matching approach to mitigate the concern that variations in the turnover-performance relationship are driven by other firm characteristics rather than political connections.”
- Do Social Ties between External Auditors and Audit Committee Members Affect Audit Quality (2016, methodology): “…information asymmetry, prior research implies that firms that appoint high-quality auditors attract higher valuations (e.g., Fan and Wong 2005; Guedhami et al. 2014). valuations corroborates our MAO results, reinforcing the inference that school ties between engagement auditors and AC…”