Political connections of newly privatized firms

By Narjess Boubakri, J. Cosset, Walid Saffar. 2008

656 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/ad1f130cebeef92185d5f0ad58bea4b1bb2247d9

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Citations in the corpus

Political connections and the cost of equity capital (2012, neutral): “2 In an international event study, Boubakri et al. (2008b) document that the nomination of a politician or of an entrepreneur in politics to the BOD of publicly listed firms, leads to an increase in the firms’ of dominant business families in Canada and argue that if the government plays a central…”
Government Connections and Financial Constraints: Evidence from a Large Representative Sample of Chinese Firms (2013, positive): “…is evidence that politically connected firms tend to be less efficient than non-connected firms (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006, Fan et al. 2007; Boubakri et al. 2008, Faccio 2010).6 Relative to politically connected firms in China, politically neutral start-ups experience faster productivity…”
Political connections, government subsidies and firm financial performance: Evidence from renewable energy manufacturing in China (2014, background): “According to their findings, politically connected firms exhibit a poor accounting performance compared with their nonconnected counterparts [11].”
Auditor Choice in Politically Connected Firms (2014, neutral): “Similar to Boubakri et al. (2008) and Chaney et al.”
Board Composition, Political Connections and Performance in State-Owned Enterprises (2012, background): “Boubakri et al. (2008) worked on a sample of 245 privatized firms observed in 41 countries over the period 1980-2002, and found a negative relationship between accounting performance and political connectedness.”
Do political connections matter for firm innovation? Evidence from emerging markets in Central Asia and Eastern Europe (2020, background): “As a relational asset that is not easily imitable by unconnected rivals (Boubakri et al. 2008; Sun et al. 2012), political connections may be a valuable source of sustained competitive advantage.”
Introducing public–private partnerships for metropolitan subways in China: what is the evidence? (2010, background): “These circumstances will probably not trouble Chinese subway commuters,: their governments do not aim for large-scale privatisation of public transport, do not use personal connections to remain in control of enterprises, do not face the serious budget deficits of some Western counterparts and usual”
State ownership reinvented? Explaining performance differences between state‐owned and private firms (2018, neutral): “…with private investors may have reduced some of the traditional problems, the costs induced by these problems may be at least partially compensated by the nonmarket rents that SOEs receive from their home governments (Boubakri et al., 2008; Boubakri et al., forthcoming; Vaaler & Schrage, 2009).”
Auditor choice in privatized firms: Empirical evidence on the role of state and foreign owners (2009, background): “Similarly, Boubakri et al. (2006) find for a sample of 245 privatized firms from 41 countries that 36% of the firms are politically connected (i.e., a current or former politician serves on the board of directors), with this likelihood positively related to government ownership and negatively…”
Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, neutral): “Politically connected firms record poor accounting performance after privatization (Boubakri et al., 2008) and after initial public offerings (Fan et al., 2007).”