Explaining Corporate Governance: Boards, Bylaws, and Charter Provisions

By Stuart L. Gillan, Jay C. Hartzell, Laura T. Starks. 2003

235 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/421cbe3f4f93d8a29bedaedf07eaee7941bc3c98

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective (2003, unknown): “…nature of corporate ownership, which is 3For analyses of corporate governance provisions across industries and firms in the United States, see, for example, Danielson and Karpoff (1998) and Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003). characterized by a large number of small shareholders (Roe, 1990).”
Cross-sectional variation in the economic consequences of international accounting harmonization: The case of mandatory IFRS adoption in the UK ☆ (2007, background): “Gillian, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) also find that the strength of monitoring through board and charter provisions is industry specific.”
Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview (2006, unknown): “Early empirical work suggests that antitakeover measures (ATMs), on average, entrench managers, given the negative abnormal returns surrounding their adoption (Malatesta and 4 For more recent work, see Danielson and Karpoff (1998), Gillan et al. (2003), and Gompers et al. (2003).”
The Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis (2007, unknown): “This is consistent with arguments forwarded by Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2004), Raheja (2005), and Harris and Raviv (2007) that board size reflects a tradeoff between the firmspecific benefits of increased monitoring and the costs of such monitoring.”
Corporate Governance and Firm Value: International Evidence (2011, unknown): “…it is not unequivocally clear that better governance is in fact related to higher company valuations as the costs associated with the implementation of stronger governance mechanisms may outweigh the benefits (e.g., Gillan et al., 2003; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Bruno and Claessens, 2010).”
Corporate Governance and Regulation: Can There Be Too Much of a Good Thing? (2007, unknown): “Gillan, Hartzell, and Starks (2003) point out that there is a difference between strong corporate governance and optimal corporate governance, as stronger corporate governance does not necessary mean better performance and higher valuation because costs may offset the benefits.”