Auctions and Information acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic Formats?

By Olivier Compte, Philippe Jehiel. 2007

158 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/4830ddd0223bf15892d40f3d9e5287d37c9b5d7d

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Dirk Bergemann
2. Anne-Katrin Roesler
3. Martin Pesendorfer
4. Balázs Szentes
5. Hiroshi Ohashi
6. Hao Li
7. Jonathan D. Levin
8. Ettore Damiano

In Marketing

1. Dirk Bergemann
2. Anne-Katrin Roesler
3. Martin Pesendorfer
4. Balázs Szentes
5. Hao Li
6. Ettore Damiano
7. Á. D. Paula

In Safety Research

1. Dirk Bergemann
2. Martin Pesendorfer
3. Hao Li
4. Ettore Damiano

Citations in the corpus

• Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing (2017, background): “Compte and Jehiel (2007) show that dynamic auctions tend to generate higher revenue than simultaneous ones.”
• Information structures in optimal auctions (2007, background): “Cremer and Khalil [4], Persico [15], and Bergemann and Välimäki [2], Jehiel and Compte [18] and for a recent survey Bergemann and Välimäki [19].”