An Agency Theoretic Analysis of the Professionalized Family Firm

By Jess H. Chua, James J. Chrisman, Erich B. Bergiel. 2009

380 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Management of Technology and Innovation, Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bc2273409e23c1ca95f8a3287a47d136e8622a2d

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Citations in the corpus

Family Firm Types Based on the Professionalization Construct (2013, methodology): “…Songini, 2006; Stewart & Hitt, 2012; Whisler, 1988; Yildirim-Öktem & Üsdiken, 2010), (d) a delegation of control and decentralization of authority (Chua et al., 2009; Hofer & Charan, 1984), (e) the establishment of formal financial control mechanisms (Chua et al., 2009; Flamholtz & Randle, 2007;…”
Governance and Trust in Family Firms: An Introduction (2010, background): “In particular, compensation policies offer family firms an opportunity to build trust or lose it (Chua et al., 2009; Sundaramurthy).”
Parent–Child Relationships: Planting the Seeds of Deviant Behavior in the Family Firm (2012, positive): “We build on recent work on altruism in the family firm (i.e., Chua et al., 2009; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Lubatkin et al., 2007) to propose that altruism can take on several possible forms that produce different circumstances.”
Are Family Firms Really More Socially Responsible? (2014, background): “Employing family members, even though they are not qualified (Chua et al., 2009), or decoupling family members’ compensation from performance outcomes (Cruz, Gómez-Mejía, & Becerra, 2010) are examples of strategies directed at preserving the “family control and influence” dimension of SEW.”
Implications of Intra-Family and External Ownership Transfer of Family Firms: Short-Term and Long-Term Performance Differences (2011, background): “, 2007), since the outside-owned companies are less likely to put a kin-based restriction on management (Chua et al., 2009).”
Family firms: A research agenda and publication guide (2011, background): “This knowledge is crucial, as recent research calls the effectiveness of outside board members in newly formed family firms into question (Chua et al., 2011). The pioneering work of McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) found”
Family Firm Heterogeneity: A Definition, Common Themes, Scholarly Progress, and Directions Forward (2021, background): “are less likely to be rewarded by the family firm (Chrisman et al., 2014; Chua et al., 2009).”
Are Family Firms Good Employers (2017, background): “This should adversely impact productivity since the limited ability of the workforce also translates into reduced effort of the workforce (Chua et al., 2009).”
Family Firm(s) Outcomes Model: Structuring Financial and Nonfinancial Outcomes Across the Family and Firm (2017, methodology): “Despite the FFO model’s utility in synthesizing and framing the portfolio of outcomes relevant to family and firms, we would encourage researchers to continue to refine the FFO model and build on the framework if we are to fully understand “the nature of family firms distinctions” (Chrisman et al., ”
Family Control and Family Firm Valuation by Family CEOs: The Importance of Intentions for Transgenerational Control (2012, background): “But the overpayment of underqualified family managers appears to be a function of altruism (Chua et al. 2009); if so, it should be considered part of socioemotional value.”
The emergence of bifurcation bias from unbalanced families: Examining HR practices in the family firm using circumplex theory (2018, background): “…conceptual analyses of the formalization and/or professionalization of HR practices in family firms have largely taken an agency perspective (Chua et al., 2009; Lubatkin et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2003a, 2003b), generally suggesting that family firms will favor family over nonfamily…”
Nonfamily Managers, Family Firms, and the Winner's Curse: The Influence of Noneconomic Goals and Bounded Rationality (2014, background): “Furthermore, unless higher wages were also paid to family managers, which would reduce firm performance, the decline in noneconomic utility might be even more severe (Chua et al., 2009).”
The Transaction Cost Economics Theory of the Family Firm: Family–Based Human Asset Specificity and the Bifurcation Bias (2012, neutral): “While altruism in general serves to limit opportunistic behavior within the family (Pollak, 1985), asymmetric altruism interferes with properly designing and enforcing the explicit and implicit contracts between family owners and family employees, and makes it difficult to perform correct performanc”
Stewardship Theory: Realism, Relevance, and Family Firm Governance (2019, background): “…whether an individual is perceived to be a steward or agent may partially be a function of their ability; principals are concerned with goal achievement, and ability and effort are sometimes hard to separate as they tend to be related (Bandura, 1982; Chua et al., 2009; Chrisman et al., 2017).”
Does Size Matter? The Moderating Effects of Firm Size on the Employment of Nonfamily Managers in Privately Held Family SMEs (2016, background): “In fact, the potential for agency problems may actually increase, because if less qualified employees are utility maximizers, they will gain greater utility by expending less effort; owing to their lower abilities, greater effort is less likely to pay off (Chua et al., 2009).”