The relationship between theory of mind and metaphor: Evidence from children with language impairment and autistic spectrum disorder
By Courtenay Norbury. 2005
307 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/bb46b646ce9abf48b6ca2a43bbfb09a6d316268a
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In Cognitive Neuroscience
In Developmental and Educational Psychology
In Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Citations in the corpus
- Why the Simple View of Reading Is Not Simplistic: Unpacking Component Skills of Reading Using a Direct and Indirect Effect Model of Reading (DIER) (2017, background): “Although theory of mind has been studied extensively as an outcome (e.g., Caillies & Sourn-Bissaoui, 2008; de Villiers & Pyers, 2002; Norbury, 2005), recent studies have shown its contribution to text comprehension (Kim, 2016; Kim & Phillips, 2014;”
- Language Development in Autism (2016, background): “…acquire the ability to draw inferences from stories (Norbury & Bishop, 2002; see also Young et al., 2005); negotiate ambiguities in language (Norbury, 2005a), and structure the stories that they tell (Norbury & Bishop, 2003) at the same time as language-ability matched non-autistic children.”
- Mindful storytellers: Emerging pragmatics and theory of mind development (2013, background): “Further, a well-developed ToM is necessary for understanding the use of metaphors, deception and irony expressed in the interlocutor’s communicative acts, and might be essential for children’s comprehension of humor (Bara et al., 1999; Norbury, 2005).”
- Unpacking pathways using the direct and indirect effects model of writing (DIEW) and the contributions of higher order cognitive skills to writing (2018, background): “…from first-order understanding (e.g., knowledge of a story character’s mistaken belief), followed by secondorder understanding (e.g., knowledge of a character’s mistaken belief about another character; Astington & Jenkins, 1999; Caillies & Sourn-Bissaoui, 2008; Kim, 2015a, 2017a; Norbury, 2005).”