Stock-based pay in new economy firms

By Kevin J. Murphy. 2003

338 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b78d36e94456ccb50cdc1f353487de2d583c76a2

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Citations in the corpus

Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives (2008, neutral): “12 Then, the manager exerts high effort eH if and only if c [ β + λL − G β + λH − G ] < ( λ − λH) e−(β−G)h (32)”
Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms (2004, neutral): “For instance, Murphy (2003) uses Execucomp data between 1992 and 2001, finding that firms classified as “new economy” used stock option compensation more intensively than large firms.”
The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market (2011, neutral): “Indeed, incentives are stronger in new economy rms (Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker 2003; Murphy 2003) and have risen over time (Jensen and Murphy 2004).”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Its Impact on Firms’ Investment Policy, Organizational Structure, and Performance (2012, background): “New economy firms are defined as firms competing in the computer, software, internet, telecommunications, or networking fields (Murphy 2003).”
Stock Options and Managerial Incentives for Risk-Taking: Evidence from FAS 123R (2012, neutral): “Hall and Murphy (2003) argue that due to their favorable accounting treatment and the fact that there is no cash outlay at the time of the grant, firms act as though the “perceived cost” of options is lower than their true economic cost.”
Incentives, Targeting and Firm Performance: An Analysis of Non-Executive Stock Options (2010, neutral): “Hillegeist and Penalva (2003) find a positive link between option-based compensation and performance when option grants are unexpectedly high. In contrast to these studies, our work accounts for the endogenous nature of stock option plans. Other studies, such as Kedia and Mozumdar (2002), examine th”
Ceo gender and firm performance (2013, methodology): “New economy firms have been described as paying the top executives with greater equity based compensations relative to the traditional firms (Murphy, 2003).”
CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses (2004, neutral): “firms mainly in the telecommunication and computer industry, which have a higher growth perspective (Murphy, 2003)).”
What are the consequences of real earnings management (2005, methodology): “Roychowdhury (2003) develops empirical measures for RM of discretionary expense and overproduction and finds that that managers trying to avoid reporting losses, undertake RM.”