The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market

By Alex Edmans, Xavier Gabaix. 2011

187 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/019571fd9cc5b744d8d139f8b1c3aa64b4f00b9d

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Citations in the corpus

Within-Firm Pay Inequality (2017, unknown): “Others argue that high CEO pay is a reward for scarce managerial talent based on the competitive assignment of CEOs in market equilibrium (Terviö (2008), Gabaix and Landier (2008), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), Edmans and Gabaix (2011)).”
Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Risk at Financial Firms (2015, unknown): “Alternatively, agents may influence output a great deal, so that principals of both risky and less-risky firms may find it optimal to always induce maximum effort, as in Edmans and Gabaix (2011).”
CEO Compensation and Corporate Risk: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013, unknown): “Because risk-averse managers may be reluctant to take such risky projects, boards can use convex payoffs to induce managers to do so (e.g., Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992; Dittmann and Yu, 2011; Edmans and Gabaix, 2011).”
Asset Prices and Institutional Investors (2013, methodology): “This specification has been adopted by, e.g., Edmans and Gabaix (2011) and Edmans et al. (2012).”
CEO Ownership, External Governance, and Risk-taking (2011, unknown): “options increase risk-taking (e.g., Dittmann and Yu, 2010; Edmans and Gabaix, 2010), and evidence”
Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There (2013, background): “166 Contracting models justifying the use of stock options rather than stock typically focus on optimal risk taking rather than (or in addition to) effort incentives (see, for example, Hirshleifer and Suh (1992) and Edmans and Gabaix (2011)).”
Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, unknown): “ = 1− q 1− 2( − 1)20(∗)2 (−1)−ln   ( − 1)20(∗)  (27)”
Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay (2013, background): “Furthermore, a risk-averse CEO should demand a pay premium for accepting the increased risk of equity-based pay (e.g., Hall and Murphy, 2002; Conyon, Core and Guay, 2011; and Edmans and Gabaix, 2011).”
CEO Pay and Firm Size: an Update after the Crisis (2013, unknown): “On the theoretical side, it would be good to extend the model to incentives (see Edmans, Gabaix and Landier (2009) and Edmans and Gabaix (2011) for static models that integrate well with GL, and Dittmann et al. (2010) for a behavioral approach), in particular with dynamic incentives and CEO…”