CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses

By Yaniv Grinstein, Paul Hribar. 2004

689 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/edfb1902b8a0681d743e4f918b48301eab4957ed

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Citations in the corpus

Target’s earnings quality and bidders’ takeover decisions (2013, neutral): “Consistent with this view, Urcan, Radhakrishnan and Demirkan (2008) find that conglomerate firms with poor earnings quality suffer a larger diversification discount.”
Deal Size, Acquisition Premia and Shareholder Gains (2013, neutral): “Moreover, managers may overpay for large targets because they generally provide particularly high private benefits (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; Loderer and Martin, 1990; Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007).”
The Effect of Board Capital and CEO Power on Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures (2016, background): “…CEO duality (Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Jackling and Johl 2009), CEO ownership (Veprauskaite and Adams 2013), CEO tenure (Morck et al. 1988; Brookman and Thistle 2009) and CEO remuneration (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Florackis and Ozkan 2009; Jiraporn and Chintrakarn 2013) as proxies of CEO power.”
Critical success factors through the Mergers and Acquisitions process:revealing pre- and post- M&A connections for improved performance (2013, background): “…compensation in M&A situations might have the adverse effect of fueling managerial opportunistic behavior at the expense of shareholders, and powerful top managers might actually use M&A compensation policy as mechanisms to enhance their personal bonuses and rewards (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004).”
The Pre-Deal Phase of Mergers and Acquisitions: A Review and Research Agenda (2020, background): “Similarly, CEOs have been found to engage more actively in M&A when they are compensated in stock options (Lewellen, Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985; Sanders, 2001) or have high relative power vis-à-vis the board (Grinstein & Hribar, 2004).”
Acquisitions Driven by Stock Overvaluation: Are They Good Deals? (2013, background): “Grinstein and Hribar (2004) show that CEOs having more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger M&A bonuses, but these bonuses are not related to deal performance.”
CEO Preferences and Acquisitions (2014, neutral): “See, for example, Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985), Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997), Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2001), Grinstein and Hribar (2004), Harford and Li (2007), and Yim (2010).”
Value creation from M&As: New evidence (2017, neutral): “…off more frequently, with the most prevalent ones being overpayment (Loderer and Martin, 1990) emanating from hefty private benefits (Jensen, 1986, Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007) or adverse managerial traits such us overestimation of the top executives’ ability to extract…”
The effect of CEO power on bond ratings and yields (2010, neutral): “Grinstein and Hribar (2004) provide evidence consistent with this view.”
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs (2011, background): “…first subsection reports results excluding the rigging terms, so that we can examine whether the previously documented relation between power and compensation (Grinstein and Hribar, 2003; Adams, Almeida and Ferreira, 2005) is due, in part, to the omission of rigging in the empirical specification.”