CEO incentives, innovation, and performance in technology‐intensive firms: a reconciliation of outcome and behavior‐based incentive schemes

By Marianna Makri, Peter J. Lane, Luis R. Gómez-Mejía. 2006

245 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/b1eadd8c4d277a13467c48ec2297e639f783b22e

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Citations in the corpus

Socioemotional Wealth and Business Risks in Family-controlled Firms: Evidence from Spanish Olive Oil Mills (2007, background): “Decisions concerning R&D investments, entering new markets, capital expenditures, debt financing, and the like involve more ambiguity in terms of the associated financial risks, returns, and potential loss of family control (Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia, 2006).”
Toward a Configurational Perspective on the CEO (2016, background): “Scholars have described how CEO interests vary as they relate to innovation (e.g., Makri et al., 2006), new ventures (e.g., Wasserman, 2006), and diversification (e.g., Ramaswamy, Li, & Veliyath, 2002).”
Complementary technologies, knowledge relatedness, and invention outcomes in high technology mergers and acquisitions (2009, methodology): “Using recent research on science, technology, and invention (Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia, 2006; Henard and McFadyen, 2005), we develop and test a more robust model of relatedness and invention1 performance of high-technology M&As that considers science similarity and complementarity as important…”
Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments (2007, unknown): “More recently, Makri, Lane, and Gomez-Mejia (2006) examined the relationship between CEO incentives, innovation, and firm performance in technology-intensive firms.”
Do Corporate Social Performance Targets in Executive Compensation Contribute to Corporate Social Performance? (2016, methodology): “Providing managers with financial incentives in the form of a compensation contract is a widely used approach to align the interests of the principals and the agents (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Deckop et al. 2006; Makri et al. 2006).”
What I See, What I Do (2015, background): “We grounded our arguments in the upper echelons theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and the firm innovation literature (Makri et al., 2006; Miller & Toulouse, 1986).”
Too Good to be True: Board Structural Independence as a Moderator of CEO Pay-for-Firm-Performance (2011, unknown): “For instance, Makri et al. (2006) found that while firm-level performance measures were linked to annual incentive cash payments, CEO total pay was linked to behavioural criteria.”
An Integrated Agency-Resource Dependence View of the Influence of Directors' Human and Relational Capital on Firms' R&D Spending (2011, background): “…of R&D spending are examining the influence of corporate governance antecedents like ownership (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 2002), compensation (e.g. Makri et al., 2006), the market for corporate control (e.g. Hitt et al., 1996), and boards (e.g. Kor, 2006) on R&D spending, capabilities, and…”