Responsibility and effort in an experimental labor market

By Gary Charness. 2000

231 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/af525d497d5e0c58d93e365cfaa45c9f9f860513

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Citations in the corpus

Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity (2001, background): “5 See, e. g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993, 1998), Charness (1996, 2000), Fehr and Falk, (1999), Gächter and Falk (1999), Falk, Gächter and Kovacs (1999), Hannan, Kagel and Moser (1999) and Brandts and Charness (1999). choices.”
What's in a Name? Anonymity and Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games (2008, background): “16 Charness (2000) provides evidence from a gift-exchange experiment that suggests that people are more generous when the responsibility for an allocation rests solely on their own shoulders.”
Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms (2002, unknown): “…several other studies indicating that subjects are heterogeneous with regard to their propensity to exhibit strong reciprocity (Bolle 1998; Fehr and Falk 1999; McCabe, Rassenti and Smith 1998; Charness 2000; McCabe, Rigdon and Smith 2000; Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner 2000; Gächter and Falk 2001).”
An investment game with third-party intervention (2007, background): “9 See, for example, Camerer (2003), Güth et al. (1982), Fehr et al. (1997), or Ostrom et al.”
Do Labour Market Conditions Affect Gift Exchange? Some Experimental Evidence (2004, unknown): “While not predicted by any of the leading models of social preferences, the reductions in effort and in the proportion of top wages paid in the MW treatment are consistent with the responsibility-alleviation in Charness (2000).”
WHY SOCIAL PREFERENCES M ATTER - T HE IMPACT OF N ON-SELFISH MOTIVES O N C OMPETITION, COOPERATION A ND INCENTIVES (2002, unknown): “Our models typically allow heterogeneous tastes with regard to apples and bananas, with regard to hazardous and safe jobs, etc., but in the important realm of social preferences mainstream economics adheres to the extreme self-interest assumption.”
Intention and Stochastic Outcomes: An Experimental Study (2007, background): “…find no evidence of either positive or negative reciprocity when comparing binary responses 2 For evidence that a person may be more generous when the other party has no choice about or responsibility for the interim outcome, see Charness (2000), Charness and Rabin (2002), and Morgenstern (2004).”
Identity, Supervision, and Work Groups (2008, methodology): “But resentful workers require high compensation to work in the firm’s interest.”
The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories. (2005, methodology): “This is why Charness and Rabin augment quasi-maximin preferences by incorporating intention based reciprocity (see Section 3.3.3 below). Erlei (2004) combines elements of inequity aversion à la Fehr–Schmidt and altruistic preferences à la Charness–Rabin by assuming that”
Shifting the Blame: On Delegation and Responsibility (2008, unknown): “Also related, Charness (2000) finds that workers in a gift-exchange experiment respond with more generosity if wages are determined by a random process rather than by a neutral third party.”
The hidden advantage of delegation: pareto-improvements in a gift-exchange game (2012, background): “(2002), Charness (2004) or Charness et al. (2004) for one-shot games; and Gächter and Falk (2002) and Brown et al.”
Psychological foundations of incentives (2001, background): “…(see, e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993; Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Bolle and Kritikos 1998; Brandts and Charness 1999; Fehr and Falk 1999; McCabe, Rassenti and Smith 1998; Charness 2000; McCabe, Rigdon and Smith 2000; Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner 2000; Gächter and Falk 2001).”