The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism--Experimental Evidence and New Theories.

By Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. 2005

1,155 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Demography, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6412c7206d54154e63c8a91aa8e67707e861db7a

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Citations in the corpus

Self-selection and variations in the laboratory measurement of other-regarding preferences across subject pools: evidence from one college student and two adult samples (2013, background): “Analogous evidence of the importance of otherregarding preferences has been documented by experimental studies using dictator games, bargaining games, trust games, and gift-exchange games (for reviews see, e.g., Camerer 2003; Fehr and Schmidt 2006).”
Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs (2012, background): “Models of social preferences (e.g. Rabin 1993, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006) predict that some employees are “fair” and reciprocate high wages with high effort levels, while other employees are mainly selfinterested.13 These models also predict…”
The Altruistic Rich? Inequality and Other-Regarding Preferences for Redistribution (2017, background): “A number of alternative models have been presented to analyze different kinds of other-regarding concerns (for reviews, see Fehr and Schmidt 2006 and DellaVigna 2009).”
Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? (2017, neutral): “Fehr and Schmidt 2003, 219.”
Social comparison and risky choices (2009, neutral): “Fehr and Schmidt (2006) review much of the evidence in this field as well as models that incorporate the observed behavior.7 One important characteristic of a reference point, loss aversion, is also present with respect to the earnings of a peer and forms an important part of many influential…”
Experimental economics: Where next? (2010, background): “In a reply to an earlier critique on Shaked's website (see Shaked (2005)), Fehr and Schmidt (2005) later say that it was their results on contract games that gave them the confidence to make such large claims for their calibrated QJE model.”
Micro-Macro Links and Microfoundations in Sociology (2011, background): “Influential examples are models that assume inequity aversion or similar motives as elements of actor’s utility functions as well as heterogeneity between actors with respect to the strength of such motives (see Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Fehr and Gintis, 2007, for systematic surveys).”
Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations (2009, neutral): “costs and eectiveness of the sanctioning ( Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2006; Egas and Riedl, 2008;”
The dynamics of behavior change: Evidence from energy conservation (2016, background): “7 consumption behavior in markets (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum and Ditto, 2009) as a non-price mechanism.”
Social Intermediation in Base‐of‐the‐Pyramid Markets (2013, neutral): “…to fair prices for their products N/A © 2012 The Authors Journal of Management Studies © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and Society for the Advancement of Management Studies financial gain, or even sacrifice their own financial resources, for the financial benefit of others (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006).”