Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity

By Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt. 2001

522 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, General Decision Sciences, Safety Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/899a423a377d0da5b508c8e021e5dfded65a64c3

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Citations in the corpus

Fairness and Incentives in a Multi-Task Principal-Agent Model (2004, methodology): “15 For a detailed discussion of other attempts to model ‘‘fairness’’ in social interactions, see Fehr and Schmidt (2003).”
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights (2008, methodology): “Moreover, this approach also predicts that the 2 See Camerer (2003) and Fehr and Schmidt (2003) for recent surveys on this literature.”
Pro-social behavior in a natural setting (2004, background): “As a result of these findings, a large number of theories evolved to explain non-selfish behavior or other-regarding preferences (for a survey, see Fehr and Schmidt, 2003 ).”
Fairness and contract design (2007, methodology): “The assumption that 40 percent of all players are prepared to equalize payoffs is derived from the distribution of types calibrated in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).15 However, the qualitative results that follow are robust to changes in this distribution, as long as the share of fair types is at least…”
A Behavioral Account of the Labor Market: The Role of Fairness Concerns (2008, background): “Various theories have been suggested for modeling this type of social preferences (Benjamin 2005; Bolton & Ockenfels 2000; Charness & Rabin 2002; Falk & Fischbacher 2006; Fehr & Schmidt 1999; Rabin 1993).”
Worker Motivations, Job Satisfaction, and Loyalty in Public and Nonprofit Social Services (2006, background): “…can be used to induce the groups of agents involved to behave consistently with the organization’s goals, and to reduce the risk arising from information asymmetry and opportunistic behavior, which is curbed by establishing implicit contracts based on enterprise culture (Fehr & Schmidt, 2001).”