Strong reciprocity, human cooperation, and the enforcement of social norms

By Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, Simon Gächter. Human Nature, 2002

1,298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, Safety Research, Sociology and Political Science

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/491b0b2d82bb8e09a296bb33907f038257859f5e

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Citations in the corpus

Third Party Punishment and Social Norms (2004, background): “Thus, third-party sanctions provide a further important example for the notion of strong reciprocity (Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis et al., 2003). Our questionnaire results are consistent with the view that third-party sanctions are driven by negative emotions and negative fairn”
The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives (2008, neutral): “t =[ l +( w − l)nt)] (29) Hence, ( 27 ) and (28) imply:”
Evolution of the social contract (2014, background): “…testing the hypothesis in laboratory conditions by giving people money, offering them the chance to give it away, and observing their behaviour [Fehr et al., 2002, Camerer and Fehr, 2006, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, Gintis et al., 2003, Henrich et al., 2005, Herrmann et…”
An investment game with third-party intervention (2007, neutral): “Learn more at http://www.escholarship.org/help_copyright.html#reuse”
Mind the gap; or why humans are not just great apes (2008, background): “While social conformity and ‘good behaviour’ can always be imposed by punitive action on backsliders (Orstrom et al. 1994; CluttonBrock and Parker 1995; Fehr et al. 2002), there are limits to which such action can really enforce social cooperation.”
Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third‐Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game (2005, background): “Garrett and Weingast (1993) present a more complete theory, claiming that international adjudication works expressively by constructing a focal point solution to ambiguities that inevitably arise in international treaties (see also Cooter 1998; Posner 2000:177–79).”
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies (2005, result): “Experimental economists and others have uncovered large, consistent deviations from the textbook predictions of Homo economicus (Camerer 2003; Fehr et al. 2002; Hoffman et al. 1998; Roth 1995).”
The Biological and Evolutionary Logic of Human Cooperation (2005, background): “Thus, the Collective’s empirical result (Fehr/Gächter 2002) is in some ways a special case of Yamagishi’s 1986 paper.”