The effect of information asymmetry on negotiated budgets: an empirical investigation

By J. Fisher, James R. Frederickson, Sean A. Peffer. 2002

156 citations recorded by the source corpus.

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

Fifty-Year Overview of Judgment and Decision-Making Research in Accounting (2011, unknown): “As discussed previously, Fisher et al. (2000, 2002a) found that fairness issues caused negotiators to make concessions, even when it was not in their best interests, and that perceptions of procedural fairness affected budgetary performance.”
The effects of uncertainty on the roles of controllers and budgets: an exploratory study (2011, background): “…that, since uncertainty increases the information asymmetry between higher level managers and lower level managers, it will be related to more coercive budgeting procedures (Dunk 1993, Shields and Shields 1998, Fisher et al. 2002) and a stronger emphasis on unit controllers’ watchdog tasks.”
Testing a model of the antecedents and consequences of budgetary participation on job performance (2007, background): “Numerous studies (see e.g., Earley and Kanfer, 1985; Erez et al., 1985; Erez, 1986; Erez and Arad, 1986; Locke et al., 1988; Locke and Latham, 1990; Wofford et al., 1992; Shields and Shields, 1998; Fisher et al., 2002; Wentzel, 2002) provided empirical support for this proposed relationship between ”