Theory of mind and epistemological development: the relation between children's second-order false-belief understanding and their ability to reason about evidence
By Janet Wilde Astington, Janette Pelletier, Bruce D. Homer. 2002
207 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Education
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a0d0be235d74371416df8245dc148386a94c5138
How researchers see this paper
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In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Kathleen E. Metz
- Christopher Osterhaus
- Susanne Koerber
- Corinne Zimmerman
- Patricia A. Alexander
- Richard E. Mayer
In Education
- Kathleen E. Metz
- Christopher Osterhaus
- Susanne Koerber
- Corinne Zimmerman
- Patricia A. Alexander
- Richard E. Mayer
Citations in the corpus
- Social functioning in major depressive disorder. (2016, unknown): “Second-order beliefs refer to the ability to infer what one person thinks about another person's thoughts (Astington et al., 2002).”
- Individual Differences in Early Scientific Thinking: Assessment, Cognitive Influences, and Their Relevance for Science Learning (2019, background): “…their beliefs are not directly supported by evidence (which is the naïve epistemological position, also referred to as the copy theory of knowledge (Carey et al., 1989), but that rather our interpretations of the evidence speak for or against a hypothesis (Astington et al., 2002; Osterhaus et al.).”
- Disentangling Robust Developmental Constraints From the Instructionally Mutable: Young Children's Epistemic Reasoning About a Study of Their Own Design (2011, background): “Astington, Pelletier, and Homer (2002) found substantial development from kindergarten to first grade in children’s capacity to differentiate evidence for a belief from the actual cause of the event (“Why p?””