Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation

By L. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried. 2004

1,849 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/9e5ee8d312d38702b7070815ab2e7f72aaab58c4

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Finance

Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Backdating of Executive Stock Options (2009, positive): “CEOs have power to influence board decisions in a variety of ways, including: CEOs are typically involved in the director selection process; CEOs can use their firm’s resources or their personal influence to benefit directors both inside and outside the firm; when setting CEO pay, compensation commi”
An ill wind? Terrorist attacks and CEO compensation (2020, methodology): “Finally, we use the CEO’s tenure (CEO Tenure) as a third proxy for CEO power because the ability to influence company decisions likely increases with greater tenure (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004; van Essen et al., 2015; Abernethy et al., 2015).”
What do we know about Private Family Firms? A Meta–Analytical Review (2015, background): “Especially in dispersedly owned firms, professional managers lack day-to-day monitoring (Eisenhardt, 1989) and can frequently co-opt external board members who are nominally representing the interests of the firm’s owners (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004).”
Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives (2008, background): “The extent of the suboptimality of this investment strategy is laid out in point (3) of Proposition 4.”
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem (2003, positive): “The disciplinary force of the market for corporate control is further weakened by the prevalence of golden parachute provisions, as well as by the acquisition-related benefits that target managers often are given to facilitate an acquisition (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)).”
Long-Run Trends in the Distribution of Income and Wealth (2014, neutral): “Freeman and Gelber (2006) 138 See Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and Bebchuck and Spamann (2009) for overviews of performance based pay in the financial sector.”
Dynamic CEO Compensation (2012, neutral): “A number of papers (e.g., Bebchuk and Fried (2004), Holmstrom (2005), Bhagat and Romano (2009)) have argued that lengthening vesting horizons 4 may deter myopia.”
Management Accounting Research in the Wake of the Crisis: Some Reflections (2011, background): “Whereas there is no denying that such perverse incentives may have played a role in some (or even too many) firms embroiled in the crisis, the picture has got to be more nuanced, though, if for no other reason that it seems equally important to understand which organizational processes might have al”
Are U.S. CEOs Paid More Than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk-adjusted Pay (2011, neutral): “E-mail: martin.conyon@ie.edu 1 SeeCore,Holthausen, and Larcker(1999),Bebchuk, Fried, and Walke(2002),Bebchuk and Fried(2004), and Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck(2004). c© The Author 2010.”
Bundles of Firm Corporate Governance Practices: A Fuzzy Set Analysis (2013, neutral): “E-mail: rgarcia@iese.edu © 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd doi:10.1111/corg.12024 executive pay (Bebchuck & Fried, 2004), ownership structure (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002), and firm performance.”
Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison (2008, background): “Bebchuk and Fried (2004) present considerable evidence that managers transfer wealth from their shareholders to themselves.”
Pay for Performance and Beyond (2017, background): “Bebchuk and Fried (2004) among others have argued that CEOs should not be allowed to enjoy windfall gains from favorable macroeconomic conditions.”