Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

By L. Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried. 2003

2,064 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/84448d6737adf7c1f096bf9b7a65e6e56fd79659

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues (2005, neutral): “See Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, (2002), cited earlier; Bebchuk and Fried (2003), cited earlier.”
Does Voluntary Adoption of a Clawback Provision Improve Financial Reporting Quality (2013, neutral): “Ed deHaan August 2023 Page 1 Ed deHaan edehaan@stanford.edu • gsb-faculty.stanford.edu/ed-dehaan/”
Strategic Flexibility and the Optimality of Pay for Sector Performance (2010, background): “[5] Bebchuk, Lucian, and Jesse Fried, 2003, “Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 71-92.”
Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats (2005, positive): “Also Bebchuk and Fried (2003), though arguing that executive compensation is part of the agency problem itself, still believe in the basic message of agency theory: “We should like to emphasize our strong support for the general idea of equity-based compensation which, if well designed, can provide…”
Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performance (2009, background): “Bebchuk and Fried (2004) assert that a nomination committee of the board is unlikely to nominate a”
Corporate Governance and Liquidity (2010, neutral): “Hence, equity ownership may increase the incentive for managers to disguise their rent seeking behavior by choosing projects that are less transparent (Bebchuk and Fried (2003)).”
Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market (2011, background): “(1987) find a positive relationship between pay and performance but a more recent study by Bebchuk and Fried (2007) relying on more recent and comprehensive data question the relationship.”
Socially Responsible Firms (2016, background): “Agency problems manifest themselves through non-value-maximizing investment choices (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989; La Porta , Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000) and managerial pay that is not tied to performance (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003).”
Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2015, background): “For example, while Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that ineffective internal governance systems are responsible for the ever rising CEO pays, Gabaix and Landier, (2008) points to the competition for managerial talent as the main driving force behind it.”
An Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Performance with Moderating Effects of CEO Power and Ownership Structure: A Case Study of the Manufacturing Sector of Pakistan (2019, background): “Managerial power theory (MPT) is presented to ﬁnd the association of CEO compensation with FP [36].”