Dynamic CEO Compensation

251 citations recorded by the source corpus.

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The Effect of Risk on the CEO Market (2011, background): “Gabaix and Landier(2008),Terviö (2008), andEisfeldt and Kuhnen(2010) present competitive assignment models of the managerial labor market, absent an agency problem.Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009),Acharya and Volpin(2010), Axelson and Bond(2010),Dicks (2010), andFalato, Li, and Milbourn(2010) add ”
Asset Prices and Institutional Investors (2013, methodology): “This specification has been adopted by, e.g., Edmans and Gabaix (2011) and Edmans et al. (2012).”
Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016, unknown): “4.1 Dynamic Incentives: A Simple Discrete Time Model We present here the discrete-time version of the Edmans et al. (2012) model, which uses the EG framework to yield tractable solutions.”
Managerial Turnover in a Changing World (2012, methodology): “See also Edmans and Gabaix ð2011Þ and Edmans et al. ð2012Þ for recent contributions in which, as in Laffont and Tirole ð1986Þ and in the current paper, the moral hazard problem is solved using techniques from the mechanism design literature.”