A Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance
By David P. Baron. 2009
359 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Information Systems and Management, Safety Research, Strategy and Management
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/97b22b99b31d767642dc9d3773dcff10d8625d77
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Information Systems and Management
- Henry L. Friedman
- Mirko S. Heinle
- Patricia Crifo
- Caroline Flammer
- M. Hartmann
- S. Cavaco
- Markus Kitzmueller
- Henri Kuokkanen
In Safety Research
- Henry L. Friedman
- Mirko S. Heinle
- Patricia Crifo
- Luca Lambertini
- Alessandro Tampieri
- Caroline Flammer
- Markus Kitzmueller
- Jay Shimshack
In Strategy and Management
- S. Dorobantu
- Lite J. Nartey
- Henry L. Friedman
- Mirko S. Heinle
- C. Manescu
- Constantin Belu
- M. Hartmann
- W. Henisz
Citations in the corpus
- Taste, information, and asset prices: implications for the valuation of CSR (2016, positive): “Baron (2007, 2009) and Graff Zivin and Small (2005) present models with investors who value firms’ charitable contributions or activities to mitigate externalities (termed ‘‘moral management’’) in a setting where investors can also contribute their own cash for similar purposes.”
- Strategic corporate social responsibility and economic performance (2013, background): “For example, Baron (2009) disentangles the strategic component of CSR based entirely on judgement, by selecting those strengths in the KLD database ‘. . . that correspond to activities that appear to favour the public directly and seem to be cast that way by the media’.”
- Responsible investing: The ESG-efficient frontier (2020, neutral): “See also the literature on corporate social responsibility, e.g., Baron (2009), Benabou and Tirole (2010), and Hart and Zingales (2017).”
- When Necessity Becomes a Virtue: The Effect of Product Market Competition on Corporate Social Responsibility (2010, neutral): “This concept of CSR corresponds to what Baron (2006a) denominates Corporate Social Performance and includes performance motivated by self-interest and not only morally-motivated performance.”
- Corporate social responsibility in the food sector (2011, background): “The results show that revealed corporate misdeeds negatively impact on shareholders’ wealth, an effect which is significant and substantial across these 4 For a comprehensive model of CSR linking product markets, capital markets and the market for social pressure see Baron, 2009.”
- Economic Perspectives on Corporate Social Responsibility (2012, background): “In a more comprehensive setting, Baron (2009) predicts market values of rms, prices, pro ts, support for activists and the level of CSP in a model of product and capital markets with strategic consumers, investors and activists.”
- Spinning gold: The financial returns to stakeholder engagement (2014, background): “Activists themselves can be considered a stakeholder whose preferences, strategies or resources can influence corporate behavior (Baron, 2009, 2001, Baron & Diermeier, 2007, Frooman, 1999, Hendry, 2006, Rehbein, Waddock, & Graves, 2004, Rowley & Berman, 2000, Spar & La Mure, 2003).”
- Morally Motivated Self-Regulation (2010, background): “…public regulation as in John W. Maxwell, Thomas P. Lyon, and Steven C. Hackett (2000) and Lyon and Maxwell (2004) or deter private politics, as in David P. Baron (2009) and Baron and Daniel Diermeier (2007), where self-regulation can lead an activist to select a different target for a boycott.”
- Incentives, performance and desirability of socially responsible firms in a Cournot oligopoly (2015, background): “Other contributions study the desirability of CSR (Baron, 2001), the role of CSR in selecting motivated agents (Brekke and Nyborg, 2008) or the firm competition in the presence of “green” consumers (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995; Garcia-Gallego and Georgantzs, 2009) or social pressure (Baron, 2009).”
- Socially responsible and conventional investment funds: performance comparison and the global financial crisis (2015, result): “As is well known in this literature, we have contributions which document a positive nexus (Ahuja and Hart, 1996; Ameer et al., 1997; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Butz and Plattner, 1999; Dowell et al., 2000; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Elfenbein et al., 2007; Becchetti et al., 2008; Baron, 2009), contrasted b”