Does Monitoring Improve Labor Standards? Lessons from Nike

By Richard M. Locke, Feipeng Qin, Alberto Brause. 2006

568 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8ade305d7120a31cf6591ff73a9c934767d72ea1

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In Strategy and Management

Citations in the corpus

Work design influences: A synthesis of multilevel factors that affect the design of jobs (2017, background): “…that such initiatives appear to be more successful in achieving greater compliance from suppliers when they are accompanied by broader improvements in, for example, national labor law, national labor inspectorates, and trade union involvement and representation (ILO, 2015; Locke et al., 2007).”
Corporate Social Responsibility and Freedom of Association Rights (2012, background): “As media exposés and social movement activists highlight extreme labor abuses in factories producing for wellknown global brands, corporations have been pushed to monitor their employment relations practices through multi-stakeholder programs.(1) Yet the debate remains whether CSR is a step forward ”
Trade-based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986–2002 (2009, background): “…that, although many problems in supplier factories and exporting nations remain, Nike’s efforts have sometimes produced increased respect for various individual and collective labor rights, particularly in countries where government respect for rule of law exists (Locke, Qin, and Brause 2007).”
Movements, Markets and Fields: The Effects of Anti-Sweatshop Campaigns on U.S. Firms, 1993–2000 (2011, background): “Of course, the poor track record of factory monitoring (”
Codes in context: How states, markets, and civil society shape adherence to global labor standards: Codes in context (2015, background): “2012) and among factories with long-standing collaborative relationships with their buyers (Locke et al. 2007; Oka 2010b).”
From the Firm to the Network: Global Value Chains and Employment Relations Theory (2013, unknown): “For example, Locke et al (2007) find that the categorization of a supplier firm as a “strategic partner” (defined as tier-one suppliers) and the number of visits by production specialists, which reflects the level of explicit coordination between Nike and its suppliers, are positively related to…”
The Governance of Global Value Chains: Unresolved Human Rights, Environmental and Ethical Dilemmas in the Apple Supply Chain (2015, background): “…et al. 2008), while in addition there has been ‘‘…little progress in improving labour standards through such [private] regulation’’ (Wells 2007, p. 53), and the codes are ‘‘…not producing the large and sustained improvements in workplace conditions that many had hoped’’ (Locke et al. 2007b, p. 21).”
Clusters, Chains and Compliance: Corporate Social Responsibility and Governance in Football Manufacturing in South Asia (2010, background): “…much emphasis in the GVC literature on investigating how global lead firms implement codes of conduct throughout their supply chains and exploring how CSR codes affect working conditions (Barrientos and Smith, 2007; ETI, 2006; Locke and Romis, 2007; Locke et al., 2007, 2009; Nelson et al., 2007).”
The Transparent Supply Chain: from Resistance to Implementation at Nike and Levi-Strauss (2011, unknown): “supplying Nike and Levis are always in compliance with the companies’ codes (Locke et al., 2006).”
Global standards, global governance and the organization of global value chains (2008, background): “5 Locke et al. (2007) cite a 2003 World Bank study that indicates over 10,000 different standards and codes facing developing country producers with significant costs associated with compliance.”
Stakeholder Pressure on MNEs and the Transfer of Socially Irresponsible Practices to Subsidiaries (2013, methodology): “Because MNEs that adopt a code of conduct are unlikely to authorize CSiR acts in any of their units (Locke et al., 2007), we used the SGP’s ethics score (see Appendix A) at the HQ and subsidiary levels to measure HQ’s and subsidiary’s commitment to ethics.”