Infants' Insight into the Mind: How Deep?

By Josef Perner, T. Ruffman. Science, 2005

450 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cultural Studies, Developmental and Educational Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/88283f88254fdaf05d950bbde3989e19e22155bf

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In Cultural Studies

In Developmental and Educational Psychology

Citations in the corpus

Moral Judgment and Action in Preverbal Infants and Toddlers (2013, result): “…1932), several recent studies demonstrate that infants successfully analyze actions that involve higher order mental states, such as ignorance and false belief, if tested nonverbally (e.g., Kovacs, Teglas, & Endress, 2010; Luo, 2011; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; see also Perner & Ruffman, 2005).”
The Role of Language in Theory of Mind Development. (2014, background): “However, alternative explanations were proposed for these looking time results (e.g., Perner & Ruffman, 2005), and of course, it is impossible to ask 15-month-olds why they looked longer.”
Reconstructing constructivism: Causal models, Bayesian learning mechanisms and the theory theory (2012, unknown): “There are also debates about infants’ abilities to predict the actions of others and about how these abilities are related to the understanding of the mind that emerges at about age 4 (Leslie, 2005; O’Neill, 1996; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Perner & Ruffman, 2005).”
Mindreading in Infancy (2013, background): “In response to Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) finding of apparent false-belief understanding in 15-month-old infants, Perner and Ruffman (2005) proposed a pair of alternative explanations of the data.”
A constructivist connectionist model of transitions on false-belief tasks. (2013, unknown): “Results of our model have implications for the debate about whether infants have an understanding of beliefs or if they succeed at non-verbal tasks by using 3-way associations (Perner & Ruffman, 2005).”
Two Systems for Mindreading? (2016, background): “…accounted for without supposing that infants are capable of representing mental states at all, suggesting that their behavior can be explained in terms of low-level sensory associations (Perner and Ruffman 2005; Heyes 2014) or behavior-rules of some sort (Perner 2010; Gallagher and Povinelli 2012).”
Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? (2009, background): “For example, some suggest that infants' looking times may be explained by their adopting behavioral rules, such as " people look for objects where they last set eyes on them " (Perner & Ruffman, 2005, p. 214; Ruffman & Perner, 2005, p. 462).”
To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind (2014, background): “Perner and Ruffman (2005) argued that infants might have reflected on behavior rather than mental states, noticing that people tend to search for objects in the location they last saw them (see also Ruffman & Perner, 2005; Sirois & Jackson, 2007).”
Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind" (2013, background): “It is arguably possible in principle to explain some belief-tracking abilities by appeal to hypothetical behaviour reading capacities (Perner 1990; Perner & Ruffman 2005; Ruffman & Perner 2005).”
Rational quantitative attribution of beliefs, desires and percepts in human mentalizing (2017, background): “Non-formal cue-based accounts of infant false belief reasoning have also been proposed 36 , which argue that learned associations between agents, objects and scenes underlie classic demonstrations of infant false belief reasoning 8 .”
A visual analytics approach to understanding cycling behaviour (2012, unknown): “Hence, we have extended C-IL 2 P to handle ﬁrst-order logic by using BCP to train a ﬁrst-order neural network.”