Mindreading in Infancy
By Peter Carruthers. 2013
268 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Developmental and Educational Psychology, Statistics and Probability
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/98d332f1c34fdd2302b9e93b149584a659a63844
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In Developmental and Educational Psychology
- Peter Carruthers
- Hannes Rakoczy
- T. Ruffman
- Ulf Liszkowski
- Sebastian Dörrenberg
- R. Baillargeon
- Victoria Southgate
- A. Vernetti
In Statistics and Probability
Citations in the corpus
- Psychological and Sociomoral Reasoning in Infancy (2014, background): “Such a view, we believe, is not supported by the extensive evidence reviewed in this chapter that infants attribute mental states to agents (for related arguments, see Carruthers, 2013; Jacob, in press).”
- Two Systems for Mindreading? (2016, background): “Hence if one accepts that working-memory contents are always conscious (Prinz 2012; Carruthers 2015b), we can conclude that a representation of the agent’s belief would need to have been retrieved from long-term memory at the appropriate point in the story (when the agent’s reaching action is cued b”
- Belief-based action prediction in preverbal infants (2014, background): “While several authors have advocated an innate, modular mechanism for attributing mental states (Carruthers, 2013; Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004), it is also possible that infants could learn that others’ actions are predictable based on certain observable factors.”
- How (not) to measure infant Theory of Mind: Testing the replicability and validity of four non-verbal measures (2018, background): “According to nativist accounts, the findings suggest that ToM is a domain-specific, probably modular, capacity which is online very early in ontogeny and probably even inborn (e.g., Carruthers, 2013; Leslie, 2005).”
- To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind (2014, background): “For instance, mentalism is said to be predictive whereas minimalism is post hoc, generating rules after-the-fact to explain infant performance (Carruthers, 2013; Knudsen & Liszkowski, 2011; Surian & Geraci, 2012).”