Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind"

By Stephen A. Butterfill, Ian A. Apperly, Hannes Rakoczy, Shannon Spaulding, Tad Zawidzki. 2013

420 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, Developmental and Educational Psychology, Social Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/a3b55ed9ceb0fb26d8cce75e438ac2ae85a82172

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In Cognitive Neuroscience

In Developmental and Educational Psychology

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Citations in the corpus

Intuitive Theories (2020, background): “Children below the age of four employ an intuitive theory that takes into account an agent's perceptual access and their desires but still fails to consider that an agent's beliefs about the world may be false (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013; Gopnik & Wellman, 1992).”
Probing the depth of infants’ theory of mind: Disunity in performance across paradigms (2017, background): “…tasks has proposed a dissociation between a minimalist theory of mind that allows for infants (and adults) to track belief- like states or registrations of an agent and a full- fledged ToM that represents mental states such as false beliefs (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Butterfill & Apperly, 2013).”
Do infants understand false beliefs? We don’t know yet – A commentary on Baillargeon, Buttelmann and Southgate’s commentary (2018, background): “The popular assumption is that the penguin VoE study showcases infants’ ascriptions of false beliefs about object identity; however, the set-up could just as well be processed by tracking false beliefs about object types (Butterfill & Apperly, 2013).”
Cognitive Architecture of Belief Reasoning in Children and Adults: A Primer on the Two-Systems Account (2016, background): “To solve these puzzles, we highlight cognitive studies of children and adults to introduce an approach to the architecture of mindreading in which people can be of at least two minds about the ways in which others’ beliefs cause and rationalize behavior (1, 2).”