Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?

By Ian A. Apperly, Stephen A. Butterfill. Psychology Review, 2009

1,052 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Cultural Studies, Developmental and Educational Psychology

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/8b57cd0fe539ff6f2b3948fdd8e7e869f1a88d5a

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Citations in the corpus

Dissecting the social brain: Introducing the EmpaToM to reveal distinct neural networks and brain-behavior relations for empathy and Theory of Mind (2015, neutral): “Besides validating the EmpaToM, this finding is of interest to the mentalizing literature (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Böckler and Zwickel, 2013) because it points towards shared mechanisms that underlie taking others' visual or cognitive perspectives (cf.”
The grammar of engagement I: framework and initial exemplification (2017, background): “…2008, 2014) are further central to the debate concerning how theory of mind develops in the child and whether this development may be equated with one or several cognitive abilities (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009, for a discussion). the grammar of engagement i particular grammatical organisation.”
Theory of Mind and Neurodevelopmental Disorders of Childhood (2011, background): “However, a closer look at the mechanisms of simulation and representation reveals an unclear distinction between these two theoretical accounts of ToM, rendering the current application of these theories redundant (100).”
Testing theory of mind in large language models and humans (2024, background): “Even in cases where these models are capable of solving complex tasks 20 that are cognitively demanding even for human adults 17 , it cannot be taken for granted that they will not be tripped up by a simpler task that a human would find trivial 26 .”
The Role of Language in Theory of Mind Development. (2014, background): “…position that suggests that infants may indeed be sensitive to aspects of the watcher’s intentions, but that sensitivity may not be the same as the understanding that 4-year-olds demonstrate on explicit falsebelief reasoning tasks (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low & Perner, 2012; Southgate, 2013).”
To belief or not belief: Children’s theory of mind (2014, background): “…and, therefore, which view is more parsimonious, and further, that parsimony is not a necessarily correct means for deciding between the two views (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low & Wang, 2011), and for this reason should not be continually resurrected as the killer blow for either view over the…”
Mindreading in Infancy (2013, background): “In considering the contrast between infant mindreading and the capacities displayed by older children and adults, some have argued that infant mindreading is nonpropositional whereas the mindreading of older children is fully propositional (Apperly and Butterfill, 2009; Apperly, 2011).”
Two Systems for Mindreading? (2016, background): “While others have put forward two-systems views of various kinds (De Bruin and Newen 2012), I will focus here on the account provided by Apperly and colleagues, because of its clarity and its impact on the field (Apperly and Butterfill 2009; Apperly 2011; Butterfill and Apperly 2013).”
Probing the depth of infants’ theory of mind: Disunity in performance across paradigms (2017, background): “This rich interpretation of non- elicited responses in implicit ToM tasks is currently the subject of a hot debate (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Heyes, 2014; Perner, 2010; Ruffman, 2014; Ruffman & Perner, 2005).”
How (not) to measure infant Theory of Mind: Testing the replicability and validity of four non-verbal measures (2018, background): “This system is distinct from and potentially the developmental basis for the later-developing, fullyfledged explicit and flexible ToM system tapped in classical verbal tasks (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Low, Apperly, Butterfill, & Rakoczy, 2016).”
Symposium on S. Butterfill and I. Apperly, "How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind" (2013, background): “But there are several objections to the claim that the full range of even infants' abilities to track perceptions and beliefs could be explained in this way (Song et al. 2008; Apperly & Buerfill 2009).”
The psychology of coordination and common knowledge. (2014, background): “…the area known as Theory of Mind, intuitive psychology, mind-reading, or mentalizing, all terms for the mental representation of other people’s mental states (Baron Cohen, 1995; Frith & Frith, 2003; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; for recent reviews, see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Saxe & Young, in press).”
Cognitive Architecture of Belief Reasoning in Children and Adults: A Primer on the Two-Systems Account (2016, background): “To solve these puzzles, we highlight cognitive studies of children and adults to introduce an approach to the architecture of mindreading in which people can be of at least two minds about the ways in which others’ beliefs cause and rationalize behavior (1, 2).”