Board Leadership Structure and CEO Turnover

By Vidhan K. Goyal, Chul W. Park. 2000

737 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Gender Studies, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/81c4d62e738143cfa69c4d235279a64ed065cbb6

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Citations in the corpus

The Impact of board characteristics on Firm Performance: Evidence from Nonfinancial Listed Companies in Kuwaiti Stock Exchange (2012, background): “In relation to that, Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argued that a large board is seen as less effective in monitoring performance and could also be costly for companies in terms of compensation and increased incentives to shirk. The same conclusion was drawn by Bozeman and Daniel (2005) based on his stud”
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BOARD SIZE, BOARD COMPOSITION, CEO DUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EXPERIENCE FROM GHANA (2005, background): “Goyal & Park (2002) examine a sample of U.S. companies and find that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is lower for companies without CEO duality.”
CEO Duality , Competition , and Firm Performance (2012, neutral): “5 | P a g e that when the titles of CEO and COB are combined, CEO compensation is higher and the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance is lower (Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) and Goyal and Park (2002)).”
Industry expertise on corporate boards (2017, neutral): “11 We control for other factors known to affect CEO dismissal, including firm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985), ownership structure (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997), board size (Yermack, 1996), CEO duality (Goyal and Park, 2002), and board composition (Weisbach, 1988).”
Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections (2009, background): “7 See, for example, Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny (1989), Parrino (1997), DeFond and Park (1999), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Goyal and Park (2002), Engel, Hayes, and Wang (2003), Farrell and Whidbee (2003) and Balsam and Miharjo (2007).”
The costs of intense board monitoring (2011, positive): “In addition, we control for other factors known to affect the likelihood of CEO turnover, including ownership structure (Denis, Denis, and Sarin, 1997), board size (Yermack, 1996), CEO duality (Goyal and Park, 2002), and board composition (Weisbach, 1988).”
CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Bad Bidders Fired? (2006, background): “Weisbach (1988), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), and Goyal and Park (2002) find a significant positive relation betw en CEO turnover and CEO age.”
Riding the Merger Wave: Uncertainty, Reduced Monitoring, and Bad Acquisitions (2013, neutral): “Prior work shows that CEO/chairman duality is associated with higher CEO compensation (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999) and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance (Goyal and Park, 2002).”
Co-opted Boards (2014, neutral): “Once again, our results are similar to those in model 3.13 In terms of the other control variables, our results across the various models show that CEO duality is significantly negatively related to CEO turnover (as in Goyal and Park 2002).”
Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing (2011, neutral): “, 2009), higher levels of CEO performance payments (Lee, 2009), and the CEO being less likely of being removed following poor performance (Goyal and Park, 2002).”