The costs of intense board monitoring

By O. Faleye, Rani Hoitash, Udi Hoitash. 2011

747 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/f81782f3dd84f54c9dafc4d8419ae20770bd7a55

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Citations in the corpus

Do Better-Connected CEOs Innovate More? (2014, positive): “In contrast, Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) and Faleye et al. (2011) argue that ﬁnancial leverage constrains innovation by increasing managerial risk aversion and diminishing resources available for risky long-term projects.”
Industry expertise on corporate boards (2017, neutral): “(2010) find that outside CEOs are more likely to join boards with other outside CEOs while Faleye et al. (2015) show that the likelihood of an entrepreneur director joining a board increases with the number of other entrepreneurs currently on that board.”
Generalized Least Squares Model Averaging (2016, neutral): “, of ownership and board) affects firm performance (see, e.g., Gupta et al., 2009; Faleye et al., 2011).”
Managerial Risk Taking (2016, positive): “For example, Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) investigate CEO ownership and find that it reduces managerial risk taking, as predicted by AT, due to the CEO’s greater personal exposure.”
Independent Boards and Innovation (2017, background): “Whether such intensified board monitoring is beneficial or detrimental to shareholder wealth is less clear and may depend on the complexity of a firm's operations (Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2011; Duchin, Matsusaka , and Oguzhan, 2010; Nguyen and Nielsen, 2010).”
Conditional conservatism and the limits to earnings management (2020, positive): “The results of Faleye et al. (2011) that increased board monitoring reduces accrual-based earnings management but also innovation are consistent with this second view.”
Recategorization into the In-group (2014, background): “…perspective to understand demographically different directors’ tenures and committee appointments that are known to enhance their influence in both advising management and monitoring management (Kesner, 1988; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009; Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2011).”
Information Asymmetry and Corporate Governance (2015, neutral): “In addition, the possible impact of corporate governance on information asymmetry has been discussed in Healy and Palepu (2001), Frankel et al. (2011) and Armstrong et al.”
Board Independence, Ownership Structure and the Valuation of IPOs in Continental Europe (2014, positive): “Finally, Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) and Fischer and Swan (2013) provide evidence that excessive monitoring causes lower stock returns.”
Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking (2013, positive): “Following Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011a), we define a board as an intensive monitoring board if the majority of independent directors serve on at least two out of the three principal monitoring committees: auditing, compensation, and nominating.”