Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections

By Paul E. Fischer, J. Gramlich, Brian P. Miller, Halbert White. 2009

179 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/419725c6b664093bf4bd6fa9aedab04b3299b4c6

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Citations in the corpus

Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from Option Backdating (2012, background): “Second, we contribute to the literature on shareholder voting (Gillan and Starks 2000; Alexander, Chen, Seppi and Spatt 2009; Cai et al. 2009; Choi, Fisch and Kahan 2009; Fischer et al. 2009; Choi, Fisch and Kahan 2010; Ertimur et al. 2010).”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance Around the World (2015, unknown): “(2009) and Fischer et al. (2009) also examine outcomes of director elections other than director turnover, such as firm performance, compensation and CEO turnover, also with mixed results. Cai et al. (2009) find votes against directors are unrelated to other board memberships of a director or to sub”
The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans (2012, unknown): “In contrast to prior research that examines votes for individual directors (e.g., Cai et al., 2009; Fischer et al., 2009), shareholder sentiment regarding firms’ executive compensation policies should be more directly reflected in their votes for equity pay plans.”
Monitoring the Monitor: Distracted Institutional Investors and Board Governance (2020, unknown): “ineffective directors (Fischer et al., 2009; Aggarwal, Dahiya, and Prabhala, 2015), we further examine whether in the sensitivity of board turnovers to vote results changes as a result of investor distraction.”
Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (2012, background): “Fischer et al. (2009) show that director opposition is associated with value increasing management and board turnover. Additionally, Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) find that vote-no campaigns against directors lead to CEO turnover and increased operating performance.”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, background): “While the magnitude of these effects may make most director elections appear pointless, Cai et al. document intriguing spillover effects, as does a similar study by Fischer et al. (2009).”
Are Mutual Funds Active Voters (2015, unknown): “(2009) and Fischer et al. (2009), approximately 94% of funds’ votes are in agreement with the recommendation of ISS and/or management.”