Co-opted Boards
By Jeffrey L. Coles, Naveen D. Daniel, L. Naveen. 2014
807 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Accounting, Finance
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/73f7cbaeb82f51ccc1520ee7d320423d0ad8ea99
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Accounting
- Justin Hung Nguyen
- H. N. Duong
- Dylan B. Minor
- Michael S. Weisbach
- Angelica Gonzalez
- Zhichuan Frank Li
- Jens Hagendorff
- T. Y. Wang
In Finance
- Michael S. Weisbach
- Angelica Gonzalez
- Zhichuan Frank Li
- Dylan B. Minor
- Jens Hagendorff
- Justin Hung Nguyen
- Sirui Yin
- H. N. Duong
Citations in the corpus
- Female directors, board committees and firm performance (2018, neutral): “It is well known that CEOs influence the process of director appointments to committees and to boards in general (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014).”
- Women on board: does boardroom gender diversity affect firm risk? (2016, background): “…NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules have reduced the influence of CEOs in the nomination process, they are, at the very least, still able to approve the list of director candidates and these candidates are often voted in by shareholders (Cai, Garner, and Walking, 2009; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014).”
- Shareholder Litigation Rights and the Cost of Debt: Evidence from Derivative Lawsuits (2018, background): “The fraction of co-opted board (the board comprised of directors appointed after the CEO assumed office) is negatively related to boards'monitoring (Coles et al., 2014) and positively related to executives committing fraud (Khanna et al., 2015).”
- Economic Policy Uncertainty And Corporate Cash Holdings (2017, positive): “…al., 2017), or 9 We also obtain qualitatively similar results using board monitoring effectiveness as indicated by the board co-option measure of (Coles et al., 2014). threatened by stronger product market competitors (as proxied by higher fluidity index) (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Giroud and…”
- Independent Director Reputation Incentives and Stock Price Informativeness (2017, background): “…directors may be appointed to satisfy a firm’s needs for expertise (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2012; DeFond, Hann, and Hu, 2005), diversity in the boardroom (e.g. Adams and Ragunathan, 2015), or because of social ties to other board members (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2014; Hwang and Kim, 2009).”