Riding the Merger Wave: Uncertainty, Reduced Monitoring, and Bad Acquisitions

By R. Duchin, Breno Schmidt. 2013

227 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/cbbd0eda2adf42e3163d10272098d47763d08665

Citations in the corpus

• Financial Statement Comparability and the Efficiency of Acquisition Decisions (2018, unknown): “, 2004; Francis and Martin, 2010). The magnitudes of both acquirers’ and targets’ abnormal returns are also consistent with the findings in McNichols and Stubben (2015). Table 2 suggests that, on average, the public deals in our sample create value in that they have net positive synergies: the mean ”
• Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions (2019, unknown): “Similarly, Duchin and Schmidt (2013) confirm that end-of-wave mergers perform worse in terms of long-term stock and operating performance (but not in terms of short-run announcement returns) and find that end-of-wave mergers are undertaken by firms with poor corporate governance.”
• Motivated monitors: The importance of institutional investors׳ portfolio weights (2015, unknown): “comparable to those in Duchin and Schmidt (2013). For their 1980-2009 M&A sample, they”
• The Real Effects of Uncertainty on Merger Activity (2016, unknown): “Duchin and Schmidt (2013) show that rational, efficiency increasing activity in merger waves provides cover for increased agency-driven activity as well.”
• Restraining Overconfident CEOs through Improved Governance: Evidence from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2015, unknown): “The pre-announcement and post-announcement returns are largely consistent with prior studies, documenting a relatively low cumulative abnormal return for acquirers on average (as per Duchin and Schmidt, 2013; Humphery-Jenner and Powell, 2011).”