Nonmarket Strategy Performance: Evidence from U.S. Electric Utilities

By Jean-Philippe Bonardi, Guy L. F. Holburn, R. V. Bergh. 2006

368 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/81056b90b4d4ec7f7cc29f44128945e1910eb45c

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting in China: Symbol or Substance? (2011, positive): “First, research has shown that government agencies and bureaucracies are the key areas in the government responsible for policy implementation which leads to greater organizational oversight (Bonardi et al., 2006; Hiatt and Park, 2012).”
US State Policies for Renewable Energy: Context and Effectiveness (2011, background): “Because PUCs determine the rate a utility is allowed to earn, and therefore the rate that the utility will eventually charge to its customers, PUCs have a great effect upon investor-owned utilities and their subsequent financial success (Bonardi et al., 2006).”
Benefit Corporation Legislation and the Emergence of a Social Hybrid Category (2015, background): “Yet much of this research has focused on how firms can self-interestedly influence government agencies to reduce costs of regulatory compliance.(58) There is also a body of work that focuses on how firms can integrate these nonmarket strategies with their market strategies.”
Mixing Business With Politics: A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Political Activity (2011, background): “Obtaining rate increases (Bonardi et al. 2006), earmarks (De Figueiredo & Silverman, 2006), new import tariffs (Schuler, 1996), and government sales (Epstein, 1969) are just a few of the many ways policy changes directly and indirectly affect firm performance.”
Advancing Nonmarket Strategy Research: Institutional Perspectives in a Changing World (2012, background): “Interactions with government officials can provide firms with unique information about governmental processes that are often otherwise difficult and expensive to obtain (Frynas et al., 2006; Hillman et al., 1999).”
Corporate Lobbying Revisited (2008, background): “Numerous studies find political favors in terms of, for example, trade barriers (Goldberg and Maggi 1999), academic earmarks (de Figueiredo and Silverman 2006), regulatory inspections (Gordon and Hafer 2005), and rate-of-return regulation (Bonardi et al. 2006).”
Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach (2012, background): “These questions ignite scholarship in many fields, but direct tests of the determinants of firms’ lobbying behavior and policy influence are rare due to inherent obstacles in measuring political activities and their effectiveness (Bonardi et al. 2006).”
In Search of El Dorado: The Elusive Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments (2013, background): “Bureaucrats are likely to grant access to informants with technical and unique knowledge about the issue (Bouwen, 2002), the ability to create assessments of alternatives and solutions (Furlong, 2005), and ones seen as trustworthy (Bonardi et al., 2006).”