Corporate Lobbying Revisited

By Jin‐Hyuk Kim. 2008

123 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Strategy and Management

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/44f4d0d398614fe7c0d1205b76ab14cd53bbcf87

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Citations in the corpus

Policy Influence and Private Returns from Lobbying in the Energy Sector (2016, methodology): “As Oleszek (2010) describes in detail, which committees receive what kinds of bills is determined by precedent, public laws, memoranda of understanding between committee chairs, turf battles, and the rules of the House and Senate. I determine jurisdictional committees for a particular policy based o”
Mixing Business With Politics: A Meta-Analysis of the Antecedents and Outcomes of Corporate Political Activity (2011, background): “…support for the relationship between regulation and firm political activity (e.g., Martin, 1995; Pittman, 1976), there is some general empirical support across the management, economics, and political science fields (e.g., Hansen & Mitchell, 2001; Kim, 2008; Mitchell et al., 1997; Pittman, 1977).”
Firm lobbying and influence in developing countries: a multilevel approach (2012, background): “Consistent with existing work on corporate lobbying in the United States, multilevel estimates that control for firm-, sector-, and country-level heterogeneity support the hypotheses that lobbying and political influence increase with the firm’s size and market power.”
Political activity and firm performance within nonmarket research: A review and international comparative assessment (2015, unknown): “Holistically, studies addressing the emerging markets context touch on the many facets of the topic including how institutions shape the nature of political activity (Barron, 2011; Hillman & Keim, 1995) and firm performance outcomes (Faccio, 2006; Kim, 2008).”
Is the SEC captured? Evidence from comment-letter reviews (2017, background): “These industry-size peer contributions are likely to be associated with the political 4 contributions of a given firm due to peer effects driving political activity (e.g., Grier et al. 1994; Kim 2008), but they are less likely to directly drive the likelihood of that firm receiving a comment letter.”