Classified Boards, Firm Value, and Managerial Entrenchment

By O. Faleye. 2007

536 citations recorded by the source corpus.

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/7a5633fc91bf9150ed449a965db6f4b00f02840f

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Citations in the corpus

Corporate Governance and Firm Value: International Evidence (2011, unknown): “(Yermack, 1996), equity capital structure (e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2010), or whether the board is classified (e.g., Faleye, 2007).”
The Diversity of Corporate Board Committees and Financial Performance (2008, background): “15 For example, see Yermack (1996), Prevost, Rao, and Hossain (2002), and Faleye (2007).”
How Do Staggered Boards Affect Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013, unknown): “…by Tobin’s Q. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with staggered boards are associated with value-decreasing acquisition decisions, while Faleye (2007) reports that staggered boards are associated with lower sensitivity of compensation to ﬁrm performance and lower sensitivity of CEO…”
Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers (2015, background): “In the CEO turnover literature, a number of prior studies have found that board independence as measured by the percentage of independent directors on the board is positively related to either the likelihood of forced CEO turnover (Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001) or the sensitivity of forced CEO tur”
CEO Duality , Competition , and Firm Performance (2012, unknown): “The results of Palmon and Wald are in contrast with Faleye (2007), who find that Tobin’s Q is higher when 5 In Appendix I, we give some examples of arguments that firms make to support their decisions of having a dual leadership structure, including that it promotes clarity regarding the leadership…”
Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance (2010, background): “Notable recent papers in this large literature include Gompers et al. (2003), which examines a range of takeover defenses and voting restrictions, Bebchuk & Cohen (2005) and Faleye (2007), both of which focus on staggered boards, and Gompers et al. (2009), which studies dual-class voting structures.”
Board diversity and firm performance: evidence from the U.K. SMEs (2017, background): “On the other hand, Murray (1989) and Kunze, Boehm, and Bruch (2011) reported a negative association between age diversity and firm performance, while Faleye (2007) reported a negative and significant association between average director age and Tobin’s Q.”
The costs of intense board monitoring (2011, unknown): “Faleye et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 101 (2011) 160–181 161”
Co-opted Boards (2014, unknown): “Falaye (2007) uses Aggarwal, and Samwick-type (1999) regressions of changes in annual pay on dollar returns and interprets the coefficient on dollar returns as PPS. 7 RiskMetrics provides two different director identifiers, neither of which is fully populated for all directors.”
Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives (2011, background): “These control variables include an indicator that equals one for 33 firms that nominate new independent directors (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990) and an additional indicator for four firms that disclose nominations of new grey directors who have conflicts of interest (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999); an ”
Board classification and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from the market for corporate control (2008, unknown): “In keeping with the 8 notion that board classification facilitates managerial entrenchment, Faleye (2007) finds that classification reduces the probability of forced CEO turnover, is associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance, and is correlated with a lower sensitivity…”
It’s who you know that counts: Board connectedness and CSR performance (2020, unknown): “[Insert Table 6 about here] We implement two additional empirical estimation strategies (outlined in Faleye et al. (2014), Faleye (2007) and Cheng (2008)) to address concerns related to reverse causality.”
Do LGBT-supportive Corporate Policies Enhance Firm Performance? (2017, unknown): “Prior research (Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Faleye, 2007; Faleye & Trahan, 2011; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Yermack, 1996) demonstrates that these variables influence firm value, productivity, and profitability and thus represent necessary controls when examining the association between…”