Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance

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How researchers see this paper

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The Effect of Liquidity on Governance (2011, background): “Figure 1 summarizes the predictions of these three theories for the five hypotheses that we study.”
Are Mutual Funds Active Voters (2015, unknown): “As discussed by Yermack (2010), there can be costly side effects to voting.”
Do board characteristics drive firm performance? An international perspective (2019, background): “Kiel and Nicholson (2003) state that, in general, there is a lack of consistent evidence of the relationship between board composition and firm performance, and in fact many of the results are contradictory (Kim 2005).”
Does a Long-Term Orientation Create Value? Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity (2017, background): “) and then submits a similar proposal to all/multiple firms in which the activist has non-trivial holdings (e.g., Gillian and Stark, 2007; Yermack, 2010).”
A Corporate Culture Channel: How Increased Shareholder Governance Reduces Firm Value (2013, background): “A complete review of corporate voting and elections is beyond the scope of this paper, but additional information can be found in Kahn and Rock (2008) and Yermack (2010).”
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study (2017, unknown): “The returns to all other types of activist disclosure are relatively small, insignificant or negative (Yermack 2010).”