Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives

By Chenyang Wei, David Yermack. 2011

298 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Finance

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/e91e9a1188df9d7138133ccb26d9bb204d98d7b0

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Accounting

1. Yilei Zhang
2. Yixin Liu
3. David C. Mauer
4. G. He
5. S. W. Reza
6. Ronald W. Masulis
7. Hieu V. Phan
8. N. Travlos

In Finance

1. Yilei Zhang
2. Yixin Liu
3. David C. Mauer
4. G. He
5. S. W. Reza
6. Ronald W. Masulis
7. Dirk Hackbarth

Citations in the corpus

• The causal effect of option pay on corporate risk management (2016, unknown): “Sundaram and Yermack (2007), Edmans and Liu (2011) and Wei and Yermack (2011) argue that CEO pension benefits can constitute inside debt and, in turn, reduce risk-taking incentives.”
• Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer (2016, unknown): “The disclosure of significant inside debt positions following the SEC reform led to an increase in bond prices (Wei and Yermack 2011), and is associated with lower bond yields and fewer covenants (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 2014, using personal state income taxes as an instrument for inside debt).”
• The effect of CEO inside debt holdings on financial reporting quality (2015, methodology): “The finding complements the recent finance literature over the proposition that inside debt reduces agency cost of debt and contributes to efficient executive compensation contracting (e.g., Bushman and Smith 2001; Sundaram and Yermack 2007; Wei and Yermack 2011; Edmans and Liu 2011).”
• Seeking Safety: The Relation between CEO Inside Debt Holdings and the Riskiness of Firm Investment and Financial Policies (2012, unknown): “Determining the deferred compensation investment choices (in common stock) of individual CEOs in a systematic way is difficult as the disclosure requirements are ambiguous (Wei and Yermack, 2011).”
• Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts (2015, unknown): “Wei and Yermack (2011) study investor reactions to the disclosure of CEO’s deferred compensation.”
• Agency Problems of Corporate Philanthropy (2015, background): “For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2005) examine stock option plans of outside directors, Wei and Yermack (2011) CEO inside debt, and Yermack (2006) CEOs personal use of corporate jets.”
• Firm Cash Holdings and CEO Inside Debt (2013, background): “For example, Wei and Yermack (2011) examine how the CEO-firm relative debt-to-equity ratio influences stockholder and bondholder reactions to the disclosure of CEO inside debt, while Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013) examine how the relative leverage ratio influences the cost of debt and 6 Note…”