The New York City High School Match

By Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Parag A. Pathak, Alvin E. Roth. 2005

603 citations recorded by the source corpus.

We assisted the New York City Department of Education (NYCDOE) in designing a mechanism to match over 90,000 entering students to public high schools each year. This paper makes a very preliminary report on the design process and the first year of operation, in academic year 2003–2004, for students entering high school in fall 2004. In the first year, only about 3,000 students had to be assigned to a school for which they had not indicated a preference, which is only 10 percent of the number of such assignments the previous year. New York City has the largest public school system in the country, with over a million students. In 1969 the system was decentralized into over 30 community school districts. In the 1990s, the city began to take more centralized control (Mark Schneider et al., 2000), and in 2002, a newly reorganized NYCDOE began to reform many aspects of the school system. In May 2003, Jeremy Lack, then the NYCDOE Director of Strategic Planning, contacted one of us for advice on designing a new high-school matching process. The NYCDOE was aware of the matching process for American physicians, the National Resident Matching Program (Roth, 1984; Roth and E. Peranson, 1999). They wanted to know if it could be appropriately adapted to the city’s schools. The three authors of the present paper (and, at several crucial junctures, also Tayfun Sonmez) advised (and often convinced) Lack, his colleagues (particularly Elizabeth Sciabarra and Neil Dorosin), and the DOE’s software vendor, about the design of the match. I. The Prior (2002–2003) New York City Matching Procedure

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Education, Management Science and Operations Research

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/74ed58204afabd8a93e2adb6d9d399dbeb9982b8

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Citations in the corpus

Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism (2014, neutral): “21In the context of school choice, more than 500 programs participate in the New York City high school match (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. 2005).”
Pairwise kidney exchange (2005, neutral): “24See for instance Roth and Peranson [48], Roth [47], Wilson [62], Abdulkadiroù glu and Sönmez [6], Milgrom [33], Niederle and Roth [34], [35], Crawford [15], Abdulkadiroù glu, Pathak, and Roth [1], and Abdulkadiroù glu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez [2] for some examples.”
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism (2006, neutral): “In the two-sided matching context, a student-school pair (i, s) is said to block a matching μ if either (1) student i prefers school s to its assignment μ(i) and school s has empty seats under μ, or (2) student i prefers school s to its assignment μ(i) and school s prefers student i to at least one ”
A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects (2014, neutral): “See [1] for more details.”
Efficient Matching under Distributional Constraints: Theory and Applications (2015, neutral): “…theory advanced by tackling problems arising in practical markets.43 For instance, practical considerations in designing school choice mechanisms in Boston and New York City are discussed by Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth (2005, 2009) and Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, Roth, and Sönmez (2005, 2006).”
COURSE BIDDING AT BUSINESS SCHOOLS (2010, neutral): “There are sufficiently many students in I\ {i1, i2} such that each of such students desire a single course in C and find any other course undesirable with the conditions that (1) the number of students in I\ {i1, i2} that desire a course c ∈ C∗ ∪ {c1, c2, c3, .”
When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient (2012, neutral): “high school programs, out of over 500 available, and many students do list 12 programs [1].”
Matching with Contracts (2005, positive): “…and Tayfun Sönmez (2003) advocated a variation of the same algorithm for use by school choice programs, a similar centralized match was adopted by the New York City schools (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005b) and another is being evaluated by the Boston schools (Abdulkadiroğlu et al., 2005a).”
A theory of school‐choice lotteries (2015, positive): “They also adopted the stability interpretation (Abdulkadiroğlu, Pathak, and Roth, 2005).”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, neutral): “But the " cardinal " efficiency of school assignment—that seats at a popular school must go to those who would lose relatively more by being assigned the next best school—is an important issue.”
School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds (2011, neutral): “[3]).”
Average Individual Fairness: Algorithms, Generalization and Experiments (2019, positive): “Public school admissions in cities like New York are handled by a centralized match: students apply not just to one school, but to many, who can each make their own admissions decisions (Abdulkadiroğlu et al. (2005)).”
Online Matching and Ad Allocation (2013, positive): “This has found several important applications in the real world: it is used in matching of residents to hospitals (starting with [85]), students to high schools [1], and even kidney donors to recipients (see Kidney Exchanges [84]); Roth and Shapley were awarded the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics for ”
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks (2013, positive): “An extensive literature has studied stability in matching markets, leading to highprofile applications in entry-level labor markets such as the National Resident Matching Program and school choice programs in Boston (Abdulkadiroǧlu et al., 2005) and New York (Abdulkadiroǧlu et al.”