Bias and Conflict A Case for Logical Intuitions
By Wim De Neys. 2012
313 citations recorded by the source corpus.
Subfields: Cognitive Neuroscience, General Decision Sciences, History and Philosophy of Science
View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/641039344320a7869fc6ffab97c709ad2507559b
How researchers see this paper
The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.
In Cognitive Neuroscience
- Gordon Pennycook
- Valerie A. Thompson
- Adrian P. Banks
- Chris Hope
- Stephen M. Johnson
- Nathaniel Barr
- Wim De Neys
- J. Allan Cheyne
In General Decision Sciences
- Stephen M. Johnson
- Wim De Neys
- Valerie A. Thompson
- Adrian P. Banks
- Chris Hope
- Gordon Pennycook
- Nathaniel Barr
- Jonathan A. Fugelsang
In History and Philosophy of Science
- Adrian P. Banks
- Chris Hope
- Gordon Pennycook
- Stephen M. Johnson
- Valerie A. Thompson
- Nathaniel Barr
- Derek J. Koehler
- Daniel Kahneman
Citations in the corpus
- On the reception and detection of pseudo-profound bullshit (2015, unknown): “Recent research indicates that people are capable of detecting these sorts of conflicts (see De Neys, 2012 for a review), but that conflict monitoring failures are nonetheless an important source of bias in reasoning and decision making (Pennycook, Fugelsang & Koehler, 2015).”
- Conflict, metacognition, and analytic thinking (2014, background): “On one hand, De Neys and colleagues have shown that even reasoners who consistently respond on the basis of a heuristic response, such as belief, none-the-less show signs that the conflict between that and the normative response was detected (De Neys, 2012).”
- Analytic-thinking predicts hoax beliefs and helping behaviors in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (2020, background): “Theorists have made a distinction between more automatic, intuitive processing (System 1) and more deliberative, reflective, and analytic processing (System 2; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; De Neys, 2012; Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook, Fugelsang, et al., 2015).”
- Prior Exposure Increases Perceived Accuracy of Fake News (2018, unknown): “…making wherein multiple intuitive outputs based on low-level autonomous responses (e.g., based on automatic memory retrieval or fluency heuristics) interact to initiate high-level reasoning processes (which influence perceptions of accuracy) (De Neys, 2012; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015).”
- Lazy, not biased: Susceptibility to partisan fake news is better explained by lack of reasoning than by motivated reasoning. (2019, unknown): “According to dual-process theory, human cognition can be characterized by a distinction between autonomous, intuitive (System 1) processes and deliberative, analytic (System 2) processes (De Neys, 2012; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015a).”
- The role of analytic thinking in moral judgements and values (2014, background): “…has suggested that, apart from fluency and feelings of rightness, one of the strongest cues for analytic processing is response conflict (e.g., De Neys, 2012; De Neys & Franssens, 2009; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Pennycook et al., 2013a; Pennycook, Fugelsang, et…”
- Heuristic and analytic processes in reasoning: an event-related potential study of belief bias. (2014, methodology): “Another parallel model is De Neys’s logical intuition model (De Neys, 2012).”
- Logic, Fast and Slow: Advances in Dual-Process Theorizing (2019, background): “According to this view, multiple types of intuitive responses will be cued simultaneously (De Neys, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2015).”
- Conflict detection, dual processes, and logical intuitions: Some clarifications (2014, background): “I believe that the conflict detection findings and Logical Intuition suggestion call for a hybrid view in which there is parallel activation of two different types of System-1 processes and an optional stage of System-2 processing (see De Neys, 2012, Figure 1, p. 34).”