Reputations for toughness in patent enforcement: implications for knowledge spillovers via inventor mobility

By Rajshree Agarwal, Martin Ganco, Rosemarie H. Ziedonis. 2009

381 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Accounting, Economics and Econometrics, Management of Technology and Innovation

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/6246bad8915c5771dced838dcfd0e9e607908091

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Citations in the corpus

Recruiting for Ideas: How Firms Exploit the Prior Inventions of New Hires (2010, positive): “…to sharpen our understanding of various aspects of the mobility-knowledge flow relationship (e.g., Agrawal et al. 2006, Oettl and Agrawal 2008, Agarwal et al. 2009, Corredoira and Rosenkopf 2010).2 The above studies have advanced the field significatly by establishing an empirical link…”
Employee Mobility and Organizational Outcomes (2016, background): “Finally, firms may also use legal and retaliatory strategies to limit mobility, such as developing tough reputations for intellectual property enforcement (Agarwal et al., 2009; Ganco, Ziedonis, & Agarwal, 2015), the use and enforcement of CNCs and NSCs (Marx, 2011; Marx et al.”
Growing pains: Pre-entry experience and the challenge of transition to incumbency† (2012, background): “…across literature streams in entrepreneurship, organizational demography, and industry evolution: firm size (Acs and Audretsch, 1990; Agarwal et al., 2009; Caves, 1998; Sutton, 1997) tenure in industry (Agarwal et al., 2009; Stinchcombe, 1965; Tripsas, 2009), and experience with…”
Are network effects really all about size? The role of structure and conduct (2013, background): “Network members can develop a reputation for retaliation, honesty, trustworthiness, and dependability (e.g., Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis, 2009; Arend, 2009; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).”
Do non‐competition agreements lead firms to pursue risky R&D projects? (2014, background): “The departure of key employees leads to leakages of valuable technological know-how to competitors, who could benefit from such knowledge without incurring the costs of creating it (Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis, 2009; Shaver and Flyer, 2000).”
Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment (2009, positive): “(Agrawal et al. 2009).”
Strategic Renewal of Organizations (2009, background): “Furthermore, established organizations may deliberately encourage spinouts who produce complementary products or inputs (Agarwal et al. 2007), while at the same time discouraging rivals from competing directly in core technologies (Moore and Davis 2004, Agarwal et al. 2009).”
Rethinking Sustained Competitive Advantage from Human Capital (2012, background): “In a similar vein, Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis (2009) show that employers’ reputations for aggressive patent enforcement discourage mobility of inventors.”
Corporate Reputations: Built in or Bolted on? (2012, background): “However, to confer a sustainable competitive advantage, these reputations must lead to a separating equilibrium among rival organizations.(16) Organizations with a better reputation must be able to create and hold such a reputation, while those that are less qualified and who try to mimic this reput”
Business Model Innovation and Competitive Imitation: The Case of Sponsor-Based Business Models (2013, background): “When a business model innovation requires simple changes to an activity system, it is possible that an incumbent can implement it by simply learning about the idea (through employee mobility, for example) after an entrant has figured out the innovation (e.g., Agarwal, Ganco, and Ziedonis 2009).”