Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment

By Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky, Lee Fleming. Management Sciences, 2009

627 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Economics and Econometrics, Public Administration

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/51f338438805a571e4c3238f52e6d0e39ee1c456

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Citations in the corpus

The Firm Strikes Back (2011, background): “To date, the most consistent empirical finding is that non-competes bind workers to their employers (Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer 2006; Garmaise 2011; Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming 2009).”
Industrial Dynamics and Clusters: A Survey (2015, background): “To account for particular labour market institutions, such as the enforcement of non-compete covenants, it might be useful to include the regional level in the analysis as well (MARX et al. 2009).”
Entrepreneurial innovation: The importance of context (2014, background): “Salient formal institutional influences include, for example, property protection (Autio and Acs, 2010); regulation of entry (Djankov et al., 2002), the rule of law (Djankov et al., 2002; Levie and Autio, 2011), rules regarding competition with former employers (e.g., Marx et al., 2009).”
Contracting Over the Disclosure of Scientific Knowledge: Intellectual Property and Academic Publication (2017, neutral): “Secrecy itself is grounded in a range of institutions including formal trade secrecy law, non-compete agreements (Marx et al., 2009) and non-disclosure contracts (Williams, 2010).”
Does the Mobility of R&D Labor Increase Innovation? (2015, result): “…is underlined also by more recent studies showing that regions characterized by strong enforcement of trade secrecy laws and covenants not to compete experience lower rates of labor turnover but also less patenting and entrepreneurship (Marx et al., 2009; Png, 2012; Samila and Sorenson, 2011).”
The Second Face of Appropriability: Generative Appropriability and Its Determinants (2013, background): “…employer (Franco & Mitchell, 2008; Marx, Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009) also reduce the attractiveness of departure for employees, since they reduce employees’ value to other employers and also significantly diminish employees’ ability to work in their primary domains of expertise (Marx et al., 2009).”
The Effect of Trade Secrets Law on Stock Price Synchronicity: Evidence from the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine (2020, background): “According to Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009) and Chen et al. (2018), the three states (Texas, Florida, and Michigan) that rejected the IDD made various changes to their trade-secret protection laws, such as their non-compete enforcement policy, before their rejections of the IDD, which could…”
Top Management Human Capital, Inventor Mobility, and Corporate Innovation (2018, positive): “A growing body of work (e.g., Garmaise (2011), Marx et al. (2009)) shows that higher enforceability of these noncompete clauses constrains employees’ mobility (including that of managers).”
The local innovation spillovers of listed firms (2021, methodology): “To measure inventor movement across local firms, I follow papers such as Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming (2009) or Hombert and Matray (2017) and identify an inventor as changing employers when she files two successive patent applications that are assigned to different firms.”
Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation? (2009, neutral): “83.”