A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets

By Eduardo M. Azevedo, Jacob D. Leshno. Journal of Political Economy, 2016

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Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design (2019, background): “In large markets satisfying regularity conditions that imply a unique stable matching, the DA class includes school-proposing as well as applicantproposing DA (these conditions are spelled out in Azevedo and Leshno (2016)).”
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice (2015, unknown): “, vn) ∈ V := [0, 1] they attach to the n schools, where the outside option for students is zero.(10) The set of student types, V , is equipped with a measure μ.”
Student Portfolios and the College Admissions Problem (2014, unknown): “In a recent paper, Azevedo and Leshno (2012) assume a continuum of students in a centralized paper in the spirit of Gale and Shapley (1962), and find that it affords a characterization of equilibrium in terms of supply and demand—one of our observations too. at A rizona State U niversity L ibraries…”