Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium

By Philip J. Reny, Motty Perry. 2006

194 citations recorded by the source corpus.

Subfields: Management Science and Operations Research, Marketing

View Paper: https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/697aeca9f17d13c221541d779f53a35338c29eed

How researchers see this paper

The researchers whose trusted networks rank it highest, strongest advocate first. Every researcher gets a different order.

In Management Science and Operations Research

1. Darrell Duffie
2. Gustavo Manso
3. Aviad Heifetz
4. Zvika Neeman
5. Thomas Chaney

In Marketing

1. Gustavo Manso
2. Darrell Duffie

Citations in the corpus

• On the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (2006, background): “In a recent paper, Perry and Reny (2003) define a set to be null if it is a countable union of finitely shy sets {An}n=1, where for each n there exists a one-dimensional subspace Hn = {αxn : α ∈ R} such that λHn (An + x) = 0 for every x ∈ X.”
• Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of Ratings Inflation (2009, unknown): “9This auction is similar to the limit economy in Reny and Perry (2006), but we incorporate investor risk aversion and budget constraints. purchases the information affects the quality and the amount of information available to market participants.”
• Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition (2007, unknown): “…decentralized matching markets can " discover " price in a dynamic market just as the recent papers of Fudenberg, Mobius, and Szeidl (in press), Reny and Perry (2003), and Cripps and Swinkels (2006) have shown that the static double auction can discover price in environments more general than…”
• Information Percolation in Large Markets (2007, background): “Milgrom (1981), Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997), and Reny and Perry (2006) provide strategic foundations for the rational expectations equilibrium concept in centralized markets.”
• A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets (2016, unknown): “More broadly, in the mechanism design literature, there is a long tradition of studying the properties of large markets (Hurwicz 1972; Roberts and Postlewaite 1976; Jackson and Manelli 1997; Reny and Perry 2006; Pesendorfer and Swinkels 2000; Swinkels 2001; Bodoh-Creed 2010).”